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ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: The Chinese Intervention in Korea: An
Analysis of Warning

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Master of Science of Strategic
Intelligence, November 1985

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In November 1950 the Korean War changed dramatically; the entrance of the Communist Chinese as belligerents widened into a large-scale war what the United States had sought to keep limited in scope. The Chinese Communists achieved complete tactical surprise with a counter-offensive directed against United Nations forces, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, between 24-26 November. The event is often described as one of the classic surprise attacks in United States military history. This thesis analyzes this event from the perspective of the warning available to the American hierarchy prior to the Chinese intervention.

The following issues were considered. First, was this surprise caused by an intelligence failure? Second, if intelligence was not faulty, then what warning intelligence was available and did it result in a warning that was credibly communicated to appropriate decisionmakers? Finally, what actions were taken, given the available

warning, and could those actions be considered as adequate under the circumstances?

The topic is presented in chronological sequence. An introduction is followed by a chapter detailing the early relations between the United States and the Communist Chinese. This period, roughly spanning 1943 through 1950, is important as the perceptions and attitudes formed by each country would have an impact on the warning issue later. This is followed by a chapter dealing with the first three months of the war. During this time, American policy in Asia turned from retrenchment to armed intervention, and Communist China's attention began focusing on the American presence in Korea. The next two chapters cover the pivotal months of October and November 1950. While the period leading up to this point could be considered a prelude to credible warning, October offered the first solid evidence of Communist Chinese warnings of a possible intervention. These initial verbal warnings were punctuated by the first clashes between the opposing armed forces at the end of the month. November represented the critical period as the arena for Sino-American dialogue became the battlefield and military actions became the sole means of communication between the two countries. The final chapter offers an analysis of the events that led up to the surprise attack along with the intelligence provided throughout the period as seen in the context of the warning issue.

What is clearly demonstrated is that warning intelligence was available and that, in fact, warning of a possible Chinese intervention was received. However, the US chose to ignore the overt Chinese warnings. They chose instead to sustain the same policy that had caused Chinese fears of US aggression and precipitated the initial warnings. The Chinese saw no other alternative but to counter what they felt to be a very real and dangerous threat by entering the conflict. The Americans, unable to overcome preconceived perceptions regarding the Communist Chinese, chose to support a course of action without giving due consideration, in light of the fact that the enemy's intentions were apparently unknown, to the capabilities of an opponent whose strength was known and whose will to fight had been demonstrated. This, combined with the brilliant use of cover and deception on the part of the Chinese, led to what S.L.A. Marshall correctly termed "the longest retreat in US military history."

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THE CHINESE INTERVENTION IN KOREA:
AN ANALYSIS OF WARNING

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Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Defense
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Master of Science of Strategic
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DEDICATION

To my wife, Karlynn, whose encouragement and love is sustaining and to my father, the inspiration for all I accomplish.

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Although this paper has only one author, it was the cumulative efforts of several people that made it possible. I am deeply indebted to the faculty of the Defense Intelligence College for their guidance and technical assistance. A special note of appreciation must go to Mr. Norbert H. Marsh and Lieutenant Colonel Jo H. Kinkaid for sharing their invaluable expertise in the areas of Sino-American relations and the intricacies of Indications and Warning intelligence. They are seasoned veterans in both disciplines. I was fortunate to be able to draw from the extensive experience of Major Sanders Laubenthal, Ph.D. for assistance in research technique and design. A widely published author, her advice and direction was instrumental to the completion of this work. Finally, I would like to thank the staff of the Defense Intelligence College for molding an academic environment that both encourages and sustains the student researcher.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
1. Introduction.....	1
2. The Stage is Set: Sino-American Relations Before Korea.....	8
Early Contacts.....	9
Postwar Contacts.....	11
Breakdown in Relations.....	13
The Chinese Communist Character.....	18
The American View of Communist China.....	25
Conclusion.....	28
3. The Road to War.....	31
An American About-Face.....	32
Communist China's Reaction.....	33
Preparations for a Limited War.....	38
Stabilization in Korea.....	39
Communist China Considered.....	42
Communist China Begins to Move North.....	43
Inchon Changes the War.....	48
A Search for Policy.....	49
Heightened Concern Over Communist China....	53
Peking's Position Solidifies.....	55
Conclusion.....	60
4. The Guns Sound.....	62
China Warns the United States.....	63

US Reaction to the Warning.....	63
America Calls the Bluff.....	66
Wake Island.....	68
UN Forces Drive to the Yalu.....	71
MacArthur Defies the Directive.....	73
Communist China Strikes.....	75
American Reactions.....	77
Conclusion.....	79
5. "An Entirely New War".....	81
China Ups the Ante.....	82
Intelligence Hardens.....	83
Reappraisal of the Situation.....	89
The CCF Fades Away - The Lull.....	94
MacArthur's Plans Completed.....	95
Intelligence in the Interim.....	97
"The Last Clear Chance".....	100
Intelligence on the Eve of Disaster.....	102
Conclusion.....	103
6. Analysis and Conclusions.....	105
Why Intervention?.....	106
Surprise Attack--Contributing Factors.....	107
Warning and Surprise.....	112
Warning.....	114

	PAGE
Actions Taken.....	117
Final Conclusions.....	120
Endnotes.....	126
Bibliography.....	143

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In November 1950 General Douglas MacArthur's United Nations Command (UNC) was bringing to a close the nearly five-month-old Korean conflict. Through both brilliant generalship and the tenacity of a reborn and refurbished military establishment, the allied forces had abruptly turned a potential disaster into a dramatic military victory.¹ In the space of two short months, from mid-September to mid-November 1950, the UNC had progressed from holding what can only be called desperate defensive positions guarding the port of Pusan, the only remaining evacuation point, to having secured the majority of the Korean peninsula. This offensive resulted in the virtual destruction of the North Korean Army and the capture of the enemy capital, Pyongyang. So pervasive, now, was the atmosphere of victory that plans for the disposition of forces at the conclusion of hostilities had been drafted and approved,² supplies bound for Korea were being diverted to Hawaii, Okinawa, and Japan,³ and MacArthur had dubbed the final push to the Manchurian border the "home by Christmas" offensive, having told one divisional commander that he'd promised the mothers of the soldiers to have them home for the holidays.⁴

Thus, on 25 November, while fully aware that Communist China had introduced forces into North Korea,⁵ allied

forces began moving North in order to fulfill the UNC's mission of "taking all appropriate steps to insure conditions of stability throughout Korea" by "clearing all of North Korea of hostile forces."⁶ On 27 November, Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), having secretly begun the infiltration of North Korea in mid-October,⁷ launched a massive counteroffensive. The CCF, numbering some 300,000,⁸ completely blunted the UN offensive, sending allied forces into a retrograde action that would not end until both Pyongyang and the South Korean capital of Seoul had been surrendered to the enemy. As military historian S.L.A. Marshall pointed out, what occurred was "the longest retreat in US military history" and resulted in the loss of nearly fifty thousand personnel within the UN Command, the annihilation of several large allied units, and the loss of millions of dollars in equipment and supplies.⁹ Further, it completely changed the political/military situation in Korea. To this end, General MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that the UNC faced "an entirely new war,"¹⁰ a war that was to last into 1953 and inflict casualties numbering in the millions.

The nearly catastrophic reversal of allied fortunes was caused primarily by the successful employment, on the part of the Communist Chinese, of the concept of surprise. For the second time in nine years the United States had been badly stung by an Asian nation due to an inability to accurately assess the intentions of a political opponent.

Although there are similarities between Korea and Pearl Harbor, it is not the purpose of this discussion to compare the two events. Rather, the intent of this paper is to analyze the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea from a framework of the indications and warning intelligence available to national level decisionmakers, emphasizing the actions taken pursuant to the information available. In contemporary intelligence vernacular, this refers to the analysis of strategic warning at the national level. Indeed, in Senate Hearings concerning his relief, General MacArthur delineated this type of strategic warning, vice a more military-oriented tactical warning, when he stated:

Now you must understand that the intelligence that a nation is going to launch a war, is not an intelligence that is available to a commander, limited to a small area of combat. That intelligence should have been given to me.¹¹

Strategic warning, as defined by contemporary military intelligence, refers to that intelligence that is received, digested, and acted upon prior to the outbreak of hostilities.¹² Tactical warning is defined within a much smaller timeframe; it concerns only the interlude between the launching of hostilities and the actual impact of the first shots fired.¹³ In a tactical warning situation, the opposing nations are already at war. While these definitions are worded to fit smoothly into conflict in a nuclear context, they are just as applicable to the analysis of this topic. Due to the nature of the topic, both definitions will be operative.

The reason for this becomes clear when events are viewed in light of the intelligence analysis capabilities available at the time of the Korean War. By necessity, any analysis of the Chinese intervention must include aspects of both strategic and tactical warning. First, the fledgling 1950's intelligence community had limited capabilities, particularly in regards to Communist China, and thus depended upon inputs from the Far East Command (FEC) for much of its information;¹⁴ and second, as the following will show, tactical warning of a possible large-scale CCF intervention was first indicated in late October, a full month before the counteroffensive began. Thus, both tactical and strategic level intelligence were, by necessity, integrated in formulating US policy; therefore attention must be paid to the intelligence derived from both sources in any analysis of the topic.

That the Communist Chinese successfully surprised both the US government and allied forces in Korea is clear from the results. The military reversals speak for themselves. The CCF adeptly infiltrated elements of two Field Armies into North Korea in an environment in which allied forces dominated all air, ground and sea avenues into North Korea. They accomplished tactical surprise through deception, rigid night march procedures, and an incredible camouflage discipline that thwarted allied aerial reconnaissance efforts.¹⁵ When FEC intelligence was reporting the CCF

at strengths numbering less than 100,000, the actual number was more than three times that amount.

Similarly, neither the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department, nor the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been able to determine "conclusively" the intentions of Communist China. In fact, on the eve of the CCF counter-offensives, one of the administration's stated objectives was to ascertain the "aim of the Chinese Communist effort."¹⁶ The State Department had informed all ambassadors that information relating to Communist China's intentions in Korea was to be given priority attention.¹⁷ Still, throughout Washington, at the highest levels, definitive indications of Communist China's objectives were felt to be lacking. Was this caused by a lack of intelligence? And if it was not an intelligence failure, then what explains the inability of the administration to foresee the subsequent events or, at least, plan for a possible eventuality?

Herein lies the crux of this analysis. There are three issues that must be considered. First, was adequate intelligence available upon which to warn decisionmakers of a possible Chinese intervention? Second, was any warning ever communicated and at what level of the political/military hierarchy did it surface? Finally, were actions taken by the policymakers adequate, given the intelligence available and the circumstances prior to the CCF counteroffensive?

To sufficiently cover the events that impacted on the Chinese intervention in Korea, a review of the history of relations between the US and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will be necessary as this contact set the stage for events in Korea. Also required, but in more detail, is an examination of pertinent events between the start of the war and the November 1950 confrontation. Both an American and a Chinese perspective must be considered as the opponents' views of one another were crucial to the outcome. Finally, the critical actions and events just prior to the Chinese counteroffensive must be analyzed. To accomplish this, the circumstances critical to this topic will be presented in a chronological manner. Initially, some background on the relations between the two countries will be reviewed, spanning the period 1943 to 1950, with an emphasis on the year prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Also, an appreciation for the unique aspects of the Communist Chinese character will be provided and contrasted with the American view of that character in order to assess the accuracy of the latter.

The subsequent chapters will deal with the prelude to the intervention (June-September), in which actions were taken on both sides that solidified Communist China's decision to intervene; the initial intervention and preliminary engagements (October), during which critical warning related intelligence was acquired; and the period of final maneuvering prior to China's full-scale

intervention (November,, which provides evidence of the United States' attempt to reconcile the available warning intelligence with policy actions. This analysis will be synthesized in a final chapter that will summarize the voluminous facts bearing on the topic and shape them into the conclusions to be offered.

[Throughout this effort the place names, proper names, and titles will be presented in such a way as to parallel the Wade-Giles usages of Chinese transliterations. This will eliminate any possible confusion between the quotations used and the accompanying text. For example, the PRC will be presented as Communist China or Chicom; the People's Liberation Army of Lin Piao will read, Communist Chinese Forces (CCF); and proper names will reflect the older transliterations. For example, Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai will be referred to here as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. However, Communist China's capital will be referred to as Peking as opposed to Peiping.]

CHAPTER 2

The Stage is Set: Sino-American Relations Before Korea

The eventual clash of US and Communist Chinese forces in November 1950 was preceded by years of contact, both official and unofficial, by representatives of the United States and Mao Tse-tung's Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to Sinologists like Barnett and Tsou, these years saw the formulation of two diverse and thoroughly hardened positions that served as the foundation for subsequent hostilities. Although these two authors, and others, express some regret at the course of US policy during the period 1945-50, it is Tsou who places direct blame on the United States for the course of events.¹

That US policy was a failure is a historical fact. Yet it might have been avoided by a more careful analysis of the Communist Chinese international frame of reference. Radically different from the defunct Ching Dynasty of turn of the century China, this outlook nonetheless integrated traditional Chinese values with its own concept of Communism to create the values and perspectives that shaped the outlook of Mao's Communist China. This chapter will trace the international dialogue between the US and the CCP from roughly 1943 to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, emphasizing the period between October 1949 (the anniversary of Communist China) and the start of the war. Although it will, due to the necessity for brevity, discuss

only the rudiments of this interaction, the development of the two countries' perspectives of one another is a fundamental part of the events that followed. Additionally, the Communist Chinese national character, their goals and objectives, and their unique methods for attaining them will also be reviewed as they are part of the foundation of Communist China's national interests: interests that very much help shape events after the start of the war. Finally, this Communist Chinese perspective will be compared with the American outlook toward the new Asian nation. A revealing analysis, this comparison helps illustrate the initial points of divergence between Communist China's viewpoint and US perceptions of that viewpoint; this is a rift that eventually ... have a significant impact during the Korean War.

Early Contacts

Relations between the CCP and the United States began during World War II. During this period the antagonists fighting the Chinese Civil War had temporarily ceased hostilities to combat a larger, more dangerous foe, Japan. As such, the initial meetings between Mao Tse-tung and representatives of the United States were conducted as allies, although temporary, locked in conflict with a common fascist enemy. This relationship had benefits for both sides. Mao's early attitudes towards the United States, formed in the 1930's, saw America as a "limited

ally" in the fight against fascism.² Indeed, Mao encouraged the sending of US representatives to his enclave in Yen-an. At that point the Communist focus was on the support needed to destroy the Japanese menace, support America could provide. Mao's objective was to persuade the United States to introduce ground forces into Northern China to assist in the expulsion of the Japanese. Mao even offered to subordinate his forces to any officer of America's choosing, if they would just invade.³ Clearly Mao's willingness to offer his forces had an ulterior motive. Fighting under US command meant arms and ammunition would also be supplied;⁴ in Mao's long range plan these items would be most useful.

However, America's road to the conquest of Japan did not lead through China. The plans for a landing in Northern China and the subsequent arming of Communist forces, heartily encouraged by many American officials such as John S. Service and Raymond L. Ludden, had military merit and backing.⁵ Yet US policy required "political unity in China as the indispensable preliminary"⁶ to military aid and support. The objective of sending representatives to Yen-an was to attempt to secure that unification. Based upon an assessment of the aims of Mao and his followers, the US knew they were resolute in their aims and represented a legitimate threat to peace in China. Yet the official reports of representatives like Service encouraged the US to believe that Mao desired

friendship with the United States⁷ and, due to a misguided image of what Chinese Communism represented, they felt that a peaceful accord could be reached. The result was an America caught between the desire to sustain a legitimate government in China (Chiang Kai-shek) and the desire to mediate the unification of rival factions. It ended with the breakdown of Ambassador Patrick Hurley's efforts (he later resigned) and the resumption of civil war. Yet Hurley left behind one observation of the Chinese Communists that would hold true in the future: "Please distinguish between them [the Communist Chinese] and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, because they are different"8 It was a statement that American policy would soon repudiate in favor of one that saw communism as a global conspiracy.

Postwar Contacts

The era of US policy in China spanning war's end and the birth of the People's Republic of China reflected well the ebb and flow of American efforts in Asia.⁹ This policy wrought disastrous results in China and began a political tempest in the United States that was to have far-reaching effects. During this period the US, at once, supplied the Nationalist forces, supported Chiang as China's legitimate authority, sought negotiations between the factions--then reconsidered and drew back military support from Chiang and disengaged from China altogether. Throughout these events, peaceful resolution, without armed

intervention, was the goal of US policy. But it was to end with the US earning the condemnation of Mao and the CCP.

Contacts with the CCP were direct and open. The Marshall Mission, led by General George Marshall, traveled to China during 1946-47 in an attempt to intercede between the rival camps and develop adequate terms for a resolution of the civil war. Initially it appeared the mission might be successful. In January 1946, a cease-fire was established with the hopes of continuing talks in a peaceful environment.¹⁰ However, the unreconcilable issues of nationalization and integration of military forces caused a breakdown in mediation efforts and a resumption of the fighting. Here, as Barnett states, the failure of the US to soften Nationalist demands created "intense Chinese Communist bitterness against the Americans" and was a definite factor in the hostile attitudes reflected in policies after Mao took power.¹¹ Compounding this outlook on America was the military support the Nationalists were receiving from the US. To the Chinese Communists the Americans began to appear as traditional Marxist-Leninist imperialists. Lu Tang-yi, the CCP's propaganda chief, summarized their attitude: "After . . . World War II, the American imperialists took [the] place of the fascist . . . becoming a fortress of the world reactionary forces."¹² Yet the opportunity for a possible reconciliation was voiced by Chou En-lai during the cease-fire negotiations. When General Marshall inquired

about possible CCP ties with the USSR, Chou replied, "Of course we will lean to one side. But how far depends on you."¹³

Breakdown in Relations

As the civil war began to turn in favor of the Communists, the US began to back away from the intransigent Chiang. A Communist victory was becoming apparent and, as efforts at negotiations had failed, the US began to withdraw from China. This position was foreshadowed by statements made in the Congress such as Senator McMahon's comment, "We had best get out of China as fast as we could."¹⁴ The "China White Paper"¹⁵ formalized the Truman Administration's position. Issued on August 5, 1949, it indicated that the situation "was beyond the control of the government of the United States."¹⁶ This opened the door for the Chinese Communists' takeover of the country. With all military support to the Nationalists suspended, their forces were overcome by the Communists.

It was at this juncture that the last official contacts between Mao and the US took place. In April 1949 Ambassador John Stuart, remaining behind in Nanking after the fleeing Nationalists had left, entered talks with CCP representative Huang Hua. For two months the incipient Chinese government and the senior diplomatic representative of the United States, along with other nations, discussed the question of formal recognition of the new government.¹⁷ With the publishing of the White Paper

announcing America's intention to withdraw from China, recognition seemed possible. Indeed, as Barnett points out, initial hedging by the US on the question of recognition apparently "only sought delay, not long term ostracism."¹⁸ But the Truman administration was forced into this policy by political turmoil in Washington. The China lobby, led by Senators Connally and Knowland, had succeeded in extending Nationalist support to the tune of \$54 million dollars and had petitioned the White House not to allow recognition. As Tsou laments, "It is a measure of the predicament confronting the United States that, at a time when here officials were anxiously cutting her remaining ties with the Nationalist government, they also found it impractical and imprudent to seek to establish as quickly possible normal diplomatic relations."¹⁹ Thus, political impediments, described as "flouting the wishes of the Congress,"²⁰ played a major part in the final decision to delay recognition, a decision that many top presidential advisors opposed.²¹ Ambassador Stuart returned to the US having stirred up the already heated atmosphere of relations between Communist China and the United States and, although some limited contacts were sustained by American diplomats for a short period, the opportunities for reconciliation were now gone. Though Ambassador Stuart was invited to Peking after the Communist Chinese government was established, an intransigent State Department, embittered by China's verbal and physical

abuses of its policies and personnel, turned down this final offer to establish some type of rapport.

The issue of recognition brought to a head the seething animosities the Chinese Communists had developed towards the United States, animosities that were largely based on the history of relations examined above. Yet the development of America's China policy must also be seen in the context of the hand the Chinese Communists themselves played in its formulation, which can only be characterized as substantial. First, the tenor of Sino-American relations was punctuated by several incidents both before and after the formal establishment of the new regime. In late 1948, in Mukden, American Consul Angus Ward was put under house arrest; subsequently, in October 1949, he and his staff were thrown in jail.²² In July 1949, Vice Consul William B. Olive was arrested and beaten by police in Shanghai.²³ Finally the departure of all US diplomats from China was precipitated, in early 1950, by the seizure of all US property in Peking. All these actions reflected a Communist Chinese pride and chauvinism, in the aftermath of victory, that saw no great hurry in obtaining US recognition until their "terms and preconditions" were met.²⁴ That these incidents were the result of Mao's express wishes became clear when he stated, "As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China."²⁵ As Tsou suggests, these actions fueled the fires of the China

debate in the Congress and forced the issue of recognition of the Peking government and normalized relations to "await some change in the international behavior of the Chinese Communists and a calmer political atmosphere at home."²⁶

Also adversely impacting on Sino-American relations was the verbal hostility of the Chinese Communists towards America and their proclaimed alignment with the Soviet Union. The latter was made public in Mao's historic announcement in July 1949, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship"; this document formally allied Communist China with the Communist bloc. In it, Mao alluded to the expansionist tendencies of the new Chinese regime, offering "various forms of help" to the "people's revolution" in "all other countries" and promised support "even when victory is won, [for] it cannot be made secure without such help."²⁷ This "leaning to one side" was foreshadowed by Chou En-lai in talks with General Marshall two years before, but this formal alliance with the Soviet Union had a significant impact on how the United States viewed the new regime. One reason for this was the apparent intensity of the alliance as evidenced by the signing, in February 1950, of the Sino-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty; this created a defense alliance against Japan and "any other state that may collaborate with Japan,"²⁸ a clear reference to the United States. This served to "shatter the illusion cherished by many Americans--the illusion that China's Communists were 'different.'²⁹

Equally damaging were the antagonistic pronouncements of the Chinese Communist leadership and the various mouthpieces of the Chinese Communist press and propaganda machine. Through outlets such as Jen-Min Jih Pao (Peking Daily), Hsin Hua Yueh Pao (Peking Monthly), People's China, and Peking Radio, Communist China labeled the forces of "imperialism" as their main enemies "of whom the United States was regarded as [the] leader."³⁰ Repeatedly, Communist China referred to "American Imperialism" as the focus of the threat to their security. The Sino-Soviet treaty was a reflection of this outlook.³¹ Mao felt that US actions served to confirm Mao's position that "as an enemy, the United States posed a major threat with its avowed policy of 'containing' international communism."³² One impelling foreshadowing of future events was Mao's statement, made in the context of dealing with the external tensions brought on by the cold war, that "it is we who are going to attack them [US imperialists] not they who [are to be allowed] to attack us. They will soon be finished."³³

Communist Chinese media reflected an aggressive propaganda effort. While there are innumerable examples of Communist diatribes aimed at the US, the following is a wonderfully representative example of the bombastic and pompous nature of these outbursts:

They [the US] will not only send their running dogs inside China to carry out disruptive work and to cause trouble . . . They seek by every means and at all times to restore their positions in China . . . They are the deadly enemies of the Chinese people's liberation movement.³⁴

While statements such as these were clearly inflammatory, they portrayed Communist China's genuine fear that the US sought to control the country. The roots of this fear were inextricably interwoven into the character and values that made up the Communist Chinese regime. This mindset bears examination as a precursor to understanding China's motivations for entering the Korean War, and all the actions that led up to the intervention; but more importantly, it illuminates the inaccuracy of the American perceptions of Communist China's goals and aspirations, perceptions that provided the foundation for assessing that nation's intentions during the war.

The Chinese Communist Character

Allen S. Whiting's analysis of the Chinese Communist outlook and its effect on Chinese foreign policy, as an expression of national interests, is both insightful and revealing. It is altogether pertinent to this analysis of warning intelligence as any assessment of a nation's intentions has as its foundation a knowledge of that country's perceived national interests. These interests and goals are expressed by a country's stated foreign policy. In regards to Communist China, Whiting reveals how an analysis of the mindset that developed Communist China's early foreign policy illuminates and explains later actions in the Korean conflict. Whiting indicates that there were three components to this mindset: a Chinese component, an ideological component, and an experiential component.³⁵

The following traces the origins of these three components and offers evidence, in the form of statements and actions of Communist Chinese leaders and their government, that supports the validity of Whiting's analysis. Further, it provides the pre-war evidence available to the United States that might have offered analysts similar conclusions.

The Chinese component of Communist China's outlook reflected the xenophobic attitudes shaped by centuries of domination by external powers. A virtual paranoia of "foreign imperialists," a parallel of Manchu diatribes against "foreign devils," was one result. Consequently, the Communist Chinese tended to explain China's problems in terms of the external influences they felt formed the catalyst for them. Yet, with the integration of Mao's revolutionary energy, this traditionally introverted Chinese perspective acquired a strong expansionist element. The desire for self sufficiency was still strong, but Mao also demanded a role in the international Communist revolution and the reassertion of control over areas that historically belonged to China. He stated, "It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories."³⁶ Further, in an effort to prevent a repeat of past injustices promulgated by external powers, China sought to project Communist revolution throughout Asia, thereby expanding Chinese influence as a hedge against future attempts by foreign powers to dominate China and insuring that her position in international affairs was not

considered inferior. The manifestations of this component of Communist Chinese perspective developed very early in the life of Mac's government. The planned invasion of Formosa (hereafter Taiwan), the subduing of Tibet, the support provided to the Vietnamese Communists, and Peking's alliance with Moscow clearly indicate how Mao's foreign policy was affected by this trait. So pervasive was this expansionist tendency that Communist maps labeled many areas along their borders, "to be determined."³⁷ Communist China's demand to occupy the Nationalists' seat in the United Nations, a demand that was to become one of the roots of Sino-American problems, spoke to the importance Mao placed on status in the international realm.

Ideology was, of course, the core element in Communist China's outlook. It provided the framework for all the actions taken by Peking. Its tenets eloquently revealed both the direction China was to take and the methodology to be employed. This component was clearly shaped by Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary philosophy. Because of this, an examination of Mao's outlook is tantamount to a review of the government's. Critical to his perspective was the casting aside of the traditional Chinese principle of compromise in favor of the Marxist-Leninist concept of the inevitability of war and class struggle. This concept supported traditional Chinese fears of foreign domination by "imperialist" powers and strengthened the desire for expansion. Communist China's goal, as a partner in the

international Communist revolution, was to attain "the ultimate objective" of "waging a war against world imperialism" until it "is all blown up."³⁸ This both defined Mao's objective and indicated that the methods employed would not necessarily be peaceful ones. Because Mao saw this struggle as a clearcut issue, he disdained "neutralist" countries straddling a "middle way"³⁹ and justified his close ties with the Soviet Union, stating:

All the imperialist powers are hostile to us; if China wants independence she can never attain it without the aid of the socialist state . . . refuse Soviet aid and the revolution will fail.⁴⁰

Mao's stratified perspective clearly supported the two camps philosophy of communism versus imperialism. What was critically important to this outlook was its intensity; it described a life or death struggle. It is interesting to note that Mao applied his ideological precepts to Korea as early as 1936 when he wrote, "If the Koreans wish to break away from the claims of Japanese [read American] imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle."⁴¹

Mao's fusion of ideology and military policy previewed the instrumentalities he would use in this struggle. The link between the two is Mao's military background. It shaped "the extraordinary extent to which . . . military habits of thought permeate every aspect of Mao's mentality and his approach to virtually all problems."⁴² He saw military force as simply "a continuation of politics,"

claiming that "war is politics and war itself is a political action."⁴³

An important extension of Mao's intended use of military power was the "need for mass popular support."⁴⁴ Mao's second of three basic principles regarding the relationship between the people and the army, he saw it as critical to establishing a unified will to resist. It was vitally necessary, he felt, for the people to support impending military action and for the army to support the will of the people. The key here was Mao's use of mass propaganda campaigns as a preliminary to any military event, a tactic that would become important to intelligence analysis during the Korean War. So important was this tactic that many authorities, Hinton and Whiting included, offer as evidence of Communist China's bystander role in the initiation of the Korean War the fact that the Communist press was virtually silent before and after the June 1950 start of the war. Hence, the importance that propaganda played in Mao's military policy, and the military policy itself, can be seen as directly linked with the ideology that shaped Communist China's overall foreign policy.

The last component to Communist China's character relates to the experience of her leadership. This experiential aspect stemmed from a lack of contact with the international environment and limited access to news of outside events. As Whiting states, "From 1921 to the

seizure of power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party developed in an environment singularly isolated from world affairs."⁴⁵ Little or no news reached the enclaves of the CCP except that filtered through the Soviet press. In fact, throughout World War II TASS, the Soviet news agency, was the sole source used for the reporting of outside events. Similarly, the majority of CCP members had never travelled in Western countries. Mao himself, until his trip to Moscow in 1949, had never left China. This led to a distorted view of world events and caused Mao and some of the Chinese leadership to be relatively uninformed. The results of this isolation were dramatic. In interviews with various correspondents and contacts prior to 1949 Mao often discussed events with "much interest but little grasp of the facts."⁴⁶ His outlook reflected simplistic Soviet interpretations of events and caused him to make innumerable erroneous predictions. Operative here also was the CCP's acceptance of Soviet propaganda which led Mao and the CCP to believe that Hitler was a mere puppet of reactionary capitalists, that the Japanese Communist revolution was a certainty after the first military defeats had occurred, and that America was on the brink of economic collapse at the end of World War II.⁴⁷

Yet, ironically, events only reinforced these Soviet inspired distortions. Western reluctance to resist the Japanese during the period 1937-1941, a period in which the Soviets aided Mao in his struggle with Japan, gave credence

to CCP conceptions regarding the behavior of "imperialists." American support to the legal government of Chiang Kai-shek was seen, not as stemming from the legal position of Chiang, but as "reactionary" behavior. During this period, selectivity allowed the CCP to explain away provocative Soviet behavior in Manchuria as the actions of convicts serving in the Red Army.⁴⁸

In 1949, inflammatory reaction to Truman's "White Paper" aroused both Congressional and public opinion as Mao referred to it as positive evidence of US intervention in the Chinese civil war.⁴⁹ This reaction gives evidence of the most damaging aspect of the experiential component. The CCP's provocative behavior exacerbated relations with the US and caused subsequent American behavior that only strengthened the suspicions of the CCP as to the hostile nature of the West and bolstered its own perceived need for Soviet support. Communist China's reaction to the White Paper was instrumental in the subsequent decision to withhold recognition of Peking and to oppose its seating in the UN. However, Communist China saw a belligerent America behaving as a true enemy without any thought to analyzing the circumstances of the issue. This distorted view of the world and events had a definite impact on the decision to intervene in the Korean War and was based largely in the perceived behavior of the United States.

The American View of Communist China

In contrast to the new Communist Chinese character was how America viewed these "new Chinese." This view, too, was shaped by events during 1945-1949. Initially, the US saw the potential for, at least, neutral relations with the new Communist regime. Indeed, Ambassador Hurley claimed, at one point, that the Chinese Communists were not "dedicated communists"⁵⁰ and left China claiming, as all America hoped, that they would be different from the well-known Soviet model.

However, a tide of antagonistic Chinese Communist actions unalterably changed American opinion. What started out as a misconception of the Communists as "agrarian reformers, sincere democrats, and the like"⁵¹ only led US policy down a path that evoked counterproductive behavior. America, Tsou claims, had suffered from the "natural tendency to look at things in one's own image"⁵² and had neglected to examine the essence of Communist political theory. Also, according to Chern, America made "no attempt to assess indigenous support, nationalistic tendencies, or potential foreign orientations," choosing instead to adopt the "reflexive assumption that revolutionary or communist successes were identical with an extension of Soviet communist power in antipathy to American ideology and strategic interests."⁵³ When the US made genuine attempts to resolve the civil war, as described above, it met with an increasing hostility that by 1949 had grown

into a significant threat. The backlash in the United States was a political debate over the proportions of that threat which had a far-reaching impact.

One such impact was a fueling of Senator Joseph McCarthy's attack on Communism. He readily assailed those who gave the slightest appearance of being conciliatory towards Communist China, with John S. Service, John C. Vincent, and Phillip C. Jessup among his targets.⁵⁴ In hearings conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1950, McCarthy accused nine people of having Communist leanings, four of whom were connected with America's China policy. While McCarthyism is not the issue here, it is mentioned in order to illuminate the intensity of American attitudes towards Communist China on both pro and con sides of the issue.

Similarly, the administration and public opinion reversed their perception of China. The Sino-Soviet Treaty was the apparent clincher. This allied Communist China with a primary threat to American survival and further enhanced the fear of a "monolithic, Soviet-controlled Communist Bloc,"⁵⁵ bent on the overthrow of the Western world. Characteristically, the Soviet Union was viewed as the teacher and Communist China as the pupil. This inferior role was connected with Communist China as America firmly believed the Chinese to be mere puppets of the Soviet Union. As such, the US felt that all Chinese actions were largely dictated by the USSR. This had the

effect of focusing intelligence priorities on the Soviet Union as the leader of the bloc, to the detriment of efforts designed to detect independent action on the part of Peking. Yet, in the military's own analysis of the Chinese Communist Movement, they did "not seem to fear Moscow's political dominance over them"⁵⁶ and were fully capable of independent action.

The reaction to the Communist threat was Truman's pledge to contain its spread world-wide. This policy evoked understandable reactions in Peking and further confirmed that the United States was the primary enemy of China. Yet the containment policy was not so rigid that it could not accept political reality. Prior to the start of the Korean War, America had accepted the Nationalist defeat in China and pulled out even to the extent of leaving Taiwan exposed to Peking's plans for invading. Also, all US troops were removed from Korea. Both actions were preceded by the White Paper and Secretary of State Dean Acheson's public statements that delineated an American defensive perimeter that excluded Taiwan and Korea.⁵⁷ A reflection of America's perception of the infant Communist state, the US's apparent pullback from Asia was the result of both the military constraints, forced on the country by its commitments in Europe, and the impression that Communist China's internal problems were of a magnitude that would prevent them posing a significant threat in Asia.⁵⁸ It was largely felt that Communist China would be either "impotent or moderate" in its foreign policy.⁵⁹

Conclusion

Thus, on the eve of the Korean War, the United States and Communist China stood at opposite ends of the political spectrum with no mechanism for peaceful reconciliation of their differences. No formal diplomatic contact existed, after the early part of 1950, between Peking and Washington. While this can be seen as the result of a flawed US policy, compounded by the Communists' intransigence over the issues, the result was an America that little understood the primary objectives of Communist China and a Chinese government that had labeled the US an expansionist power, in the Japanese mold, instead of the status quo power that it was.⁶⁰

Ironically, the misperceptions that each state held of the other came close to being 180 degrees from reality in both cases. The US made several vain attempts to communicate its desire for peace in China while making every attempt to insure Communist China understood it had no desire to dominate Asia. Instead of this, Peking perceived America as an imperialist-oriented, aggressor nation committed to recovering its lost power in Asia. Because of their unique character, the Communists extracted only those signs in US actions that marked the US an enemy of China. This was to play a critical role when events in the diplomatic sphere were replaced by those on the battlefield.

Similarly, the US view of China was dominated by its association with the Soviet Union. The fear and hatred generated by the scope of the perceived Communist menace led to reactions that communicated hostility to Communist China and only served to heighten its fear of the US. Here ideology successfully distorted reality.⁶¹ American actions reflected the ardent belief that the security of the American way of life was threatened by Communism. Communist China immediately became part of the "monolithic" communist threat through its association with the Soviet Union. This intense surface reaction effectively prejudiced overall opinion and overshadowed further attempts to discern what this new China really represented. Yet the same expansionist tendencies in the USSR that formed the basis for Truman's "containment policy" were not necessarily operative in Communist China. Though the initial misconception that Chinese Communism was different from the Soviet style had been eradicated by Chinese behavior, the view held in the US was that China was largely an underdeveloped country with marked internal disorders that would take some time to overcome. Though it blustered and fumed like an aggressive nation with the international prestige and military power to give it credibility, in the US view it was not. In short, the US saw Communist China as a state whose words would not necessarily be supported by action. America saw only a China whose foreign policy ambitions would be subordinated to domestic concerns.

Thus was the stage set for the two nations to come face to face over the issues that impacted on the basic security interests of both states. Unfortunately, instead of the diplomatic arena, the primary forum for resolution of issues was to be the battlefield. This was caused largely by events that occurred before any shots were fired in Korea, shots that brought into conflict two nations ill suited to understanding one another.

CHAPTER 3

The Road to War

On June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded the South. In three days the capital, Seoul, was captured and within three weeks the only remaining unoccupied area in Korea was a tenuously held perimeter guarding the port of Pusan. The reversal of South Korea's fortunes was dramatic. However, the period July through September would be characterized by reversals. This period would see a retrenching America return to Asia with alarming rapidity and completely turn the desperate military situation around. Amphibious landings at Inchon, made possible by the solidification of the Pusan perimeter, would completely route the North Korean Army and send it fleeing back north. Too, Communist Chinese reaction to the war would see a complete reorientation of its focus. Initial concern over the last phase of the civil war, the invasion of Taiwan, would be replaced by concentration on events in Korea. Thus, sharp changes in attitudes by both East and West would highlight this period. Further it would become a period in which actions taken and decisions made on both sides would place both the United States and Communist China on the road towards eventual hostilities. By the end of September America would be dominating the battlefield, with ever growing strength, and be poised for an offensive whose objective would take UN troops to the borders of Manchuria;

Communist China, initially not concerned over events in Korea, would have completely refocused its attention towards Korea and begun to take measures in preparation for opposing UN forces; and allied concerns over Communist reactions to the war would begin to guide the war effort.

An American About-Face

Where only a few months before the United States appeared to be making good on its promise to extricate itself from the Chinese civil war, the North Korean invasion now forced what the Truman administration sought vehemently to prevent, armed intervention. The same President Truman that had "conceded Taiwan to the Communists if they could take it" ¹ on January 5, 1950 now moved quickly to counter Communist thrusts in Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. While aid to the French was the only action taken in Vietnam, US forces were ordered to intervene in Korea and to seal off the island of Taiwan.² Specifically, the US Seventh Fleet was sent to cordon off Taiwan, preventing either a Communist invasion or a Nationalist re-entry onto the mainland, and General Douglas MacArthur was given the green light to introduce American units into South Korea to save the crumbling government of Syngman Rhee. Seeking legitimacy and reflecting his sincere desire that the body become credible, Truman sought the sanction of the United Nations for all his actions. While this was the official tack throughout the war, the US was clearly the dominant participant. Displayed now was

Truman's "containment policy" in full force. American policy at this juncture was limited to furnishing "such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area";³ this position was later adopted by the UN in what the administration dubbed a "synchronized"⁴ plan for meeting the Communist invaders.

Communist China's Reaction

Communist China predictably denounced the American action in Korea, but did so in a manner that indicated little concern over Korean events. What shocked and incensed Communist China was the blockading of Taiwan. Only two days before the start of the war, Secretary of State Acheson had declared Truman's 5 January statement still valid.⁵ Peking had counted on the US to adhere to the hands-off policy and had completed preparations pursuant to invading the Nationalists' sanctuary. Communist China had openly massed troops in Central China, gathered thousands of junks, and begun training for the amphibious operation.⁶ Denied their final victory over Chiang Kai-shek, the CCP raged at this "new, premeditated aggression of America's imperialism,"⁷ pointing to this direct intervention in the Chinese civil war as "armed aggression against the territory of China."⁸ Statements by Mao Tse-tung and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai indicated that Taiwan was the key issue declaring "the fact that Taiwan is part of China will remain unchanged forever" and

that Communist China would "certainly fight to . . . liberate Taiwan."⁹ Similarly, a propaganda campaign, entitled "Resist American Invasion of Taiwan and Korea" was initiated with a clear emphasis on the former over the latter.¹⁰

Further, Communist China saw this American action, in the broad context of Asian affairs, as a blatant attempt to challenge China's assumption of the leading role in that area. As Mao stated, "the affairs of Asia should be administered by the peoples of Asia themselves and not by the United States."¹¹ This was a clear outgrowth of Mao's revolutionary ideology; Mao saw his task as that of rallying "the people throughout the world . . . to rise up and check the new aggressions of American imperialism in the Orient"¹² and also indicated that China, while focusing on Taiwan initially, now perceived ominous American intentions in Asia. The Chinese Communists saw this US action as "additional confirmation of their distorted view" of American imperialistic goals that was to "play an important part in Peking's intervention in Korea."¹³ Foreshadowing this element of Communist China's reaction was Mao's statement that provocative acts would "arouse the extensive and resolute resistance of the peoples of Asia."¹⁴ The overall result of the abrupt change in US policy was this increased distrust of American intentions and doubt about the reliability of American declarations.

One thing that became apparent was Communist China's limited involvement in the Korean invasion. While Communist China was surely informed of the impending attack, and probably gave its consent,¹⁵ it was the Soviet Union that was sponsoring the North Koreans. Indeed, Harold Hinton has postulated that Korea was only one phase of a major Communist offensive, designed by Mao and Stalin during their talks in Moscow in 1949, to simultaneously strike Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Tibet.¹⁶ Communist China's responsibility for Taiwan and Tibet (along with supplying aid to the Vietnamese Communists) was supported by its troop displacements and propaganda that pointed toward Peking's desires to reacquire her lost territories.¹⁷

That Korea was not Communist China's affair was made clear by internal press coverage. Though the leadership always informed and prepared the masses for military moves, in this case there had been no mention of Korea. In fact, initial reports of the war appeared belatedly and were relegated to secondary positions in the newspapers. ¹⁸ It appeared that Peking was cautiously avoiding any specific commitment to assisting North Korea while articles making reference to Korea were characterized by statements offering moral support only.¹⁹ Contrast this with the immediate and pointed reaction to the US blockade of Taiwan and it is easy to see why Hinton's thesis is appealing. That this attitude was communicated across the Pacific is

clear from a July New York Times article in which India's Ambassador to China, K.M. Panikkar, quotes Mao as viewing Korea as "a distant matter."²⁰

Western speculation on Communist Chinese collaboration in the North Korean attack revolved around the transfer of 12,000 native Koreans from the CCF to the North Korean Army during 1950.²¹ Yet this indicates foreknowledge more than support due to the small impact of this gesture. More revealing are the strained relations between the two Communist regimes; these strained relations stemmed from conflicts over the allocation of electric power along the Yalu River. Relations did reflect diplomatic harmony but had a distinctly distant tenor. Though recognition by Pyongyang and Peking was immediately exchanged and agreements reached concerning postal and wire communications, it was a full four months before a North Korean envoy arrived in Peking and the Chinese ambassador did not reach North Korea until August 13, 1950.²² Thus, while it was likely that Communist China had been informed of North Korean intentions, whatever support role they played was minimal and clearly not decisive.

The intention here of detailing this evidence of Peking's limited involvement is to highlight the importance of the shift in attitude towards Korea that would shortly be revealed. This early period of the war localized Sino-American conflict over the issues of Taiwan and admittance to the UN. The former issue has been covered; the latter

issue paralleled Taiwan as an integral cause of the strained relations. America's sponsoring of the effort to keep Communist China out of the UN gave Peking further indications of US hostility. Initially the issue was US recognition of Communist China, but war in Korea shifted Peking's focus to gaining admittance to the UN as both an expression of its desire for international prestige and as a tactic for resolving the Taiwan problem. The US, in Acheson's eyes, could not allow the seating of Communist China on the grounds that the discussion of Korea would be supplanted by Peking's attempts to unseat the Nationalists as a precursor to the international body's addressing North Korean aggression.²³ This issue would surface again as Sino-American actions moved closer toward war, yet it is important to mention here for its impact on the two countries perceptions of what was to become an important conduit for communications, the good offices of the Indian government.²⁴

On July 1, 1950, K.M. Panikkar secretly approached the Peking government with a peace proposal that included action by the UN's Security Council along with Communist China assuming her legitimate seat. Subsequently, Prime Minister Nehru addressed the issue in letters to Moscow and Washington. The answers paralleled the respective changing of attitudes towards India. After 10 days the Soviet Union agreed, the US soundly rejected it. Whereas Peking had previously viewed India as "squarely in the American camp,"

the communist press, specifically Jen-Min Jih Pao, now exploited this apparent breach in the Western alliance and embraced India, calling it one of "the forces of peace."²⁵ By contrast, the US now became wary of Indian sympathies, an attitude that would have dramatic effects on future Sino-American dialogue as relayed through Indian emissaries.

Preparations for a Limited War

The American effort to secure UN sanction for aid to South Korea was highly successful. By the end of 1950, fifteen nations had forces in Korea and thirty had contributed to relief and reconstruction.²⁶ Yet President Truman attempted to make it perfectly clear that US intentions involved no designs on either Taiwan or Korea. Careful not to antagonize the Communist powers, his initial directive to MacArthur limited Air Force operations in Korea to targets below the 38th parallel and authorized only restrictive action above.²⁷ In addition, he denied Air Force requests to conduct photo-reconnaissance outside the boundaries of Korea and turned down Chiang Kai-shek's offer of 30,000 Nationalist troops, claiming, "What that will do to Mao Tse-tung we do not know. We must be careful not to start a general Asiatic war."²⁸ Truman even went one step further with the antagonistic Nationalist leader. On 3 July Chiang delivered a scathing speech that placed direct blame for the war on the Russians; Truman publicly

denounced this outburst to prevent any association with such inflammatory statements.²⁹ Both politically and militarily the administration sought to convey the limited aims of its military support to South Korea; unfortunately Truman's message, as will be seen, would eventually be subverted by officials within the US hierarchy.

Stabilization in Korea

Throughout the months of July and August the UN forces being poured into the Pusan Perimeter, after suffering numerous setbacks, would eventually settle on final defensive positions and hold. Though the costs would be high to General Walton Walker's Eighth Army forces (garrison units like the 24th infantry in Japan were introduced piecemeal in front of the advancing North Korean tanks without the benefit of anti-tank weapons),³⁰ the situation appeared to be stabilizing due to the impact of US air operations and the enemy's extended lines of supply. By the end of August, Walker's command would include elements of four Army divisions (1st Cavalry, 24th, 25th, and 2d Infantry) and one Marine Brigade, along with innumerable supporting units, with more being prepared for deployment to Korea.³¹ The early fears that Korea would prove to be America's "Dunkirk" were being allayed by some of the most tenacious fighting and hard-won successes in American military history. Gone, too, was the defeatist

attitude of the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces, who now held fully one-half of the defensive positions.

Yet this was only made possible by putting an America that had drastically reduced the size of its military in 1945, back on a wartime footing. Within one month of the start of the Korean War, President Truman had requested and received from Congress authority for supplemental spending that amounted to 11 billion dollars (the entire budget at the time was projected at 14 billion), the control of wages and prices, and power to direct the allocation of strategic materials and institute rationing and credit restrictions.³² Further, Congress lifted limits on the size of the standing military and authorized the federalization of four National Guard divisions.³³ These drastic measures were not an indication that the US saw the potential for the Korean conflict to widen itself; instead it reflected the sad condition of the military and the extent of its commitments in Europe and elsewhere.³⁴ Nonetheless, this rapid mobilization suggested ominous overtones to the Chinese Communists.

In August, with the relative safety of the Pusan Perimeter appearing more assured daily, General MacArthur began to set in motion preparations for what would come to be considered the master stroke of a military genius. "Operation Chromite," better known as the Inchon Landing, had been in the concept stage as early as 3 July and the formal planning was begun on 20 July.³⁵ Its success was

to turn a desperate military situation into a resounding victory. Yet opposition to the hazards of the chosen landing beaches brought MacArthur and the JCS into conflict. Although the JCS had supported Far East Command (FEC) to the fullest extent possible, MacArthur still felt they were not placing enough emphasis on the Asian theater. In a traditional squabble between a theater commander, with a limited perspective, and "higher headquarters" responsible for the broad picture, the JCS correspondingly felt MacArthur was overly demanding.³⁶ Consequently, though the JCS tentatively approved of the plan on 25 July, they had repeated second thoughts and only eight days prior to the offensive told CINCFE "we desire your estimate as to the feasibility . . . of [the] projected operation."³⁷ MacArthur, for his part, did little to gain the confidence of the JCS as, in reality, he did not feel he was in a subordinate position though, by informal military chain of command, he indeed was. He delayed the Chromite plans requested by the JCS, forcing the sending of embarrassing "where are they" messages,³⁸ and saw the JCS's desire to approve the plans as a means of establishing, in his words, "an anticipatory alibi"³⁹ should the operation go awry. But in the end the JCS acquiesced, falling back on the inviolable military principle that the commander on the ground knows best. But what no one foresaw was that Inchon's incredible results would make MacArthur, according to General Ridgway

(MacArthur's successor), "appear invincible and the Chiefs impotent," with some of the opinion that should MacArthur order units to walk on water, "there might have been someone ready to give it a try."⁴⁰ This faltering relationship between MacArthur and the JCS, with the former having a distinct upper hand, would play a significant role in future events.

Communist China Considered

Although August brought limited optimism in regards to the viability of the Pusan Perimeter, some of General Walker's touchiest moments still lay ahead. Yet the confidence of the FEC commander in both the perimeter and his future plans necessitated planning for the eventuality of success. This planning would see the first formal consideration of Peking's potential reactions to UNC successes. Still, as early as 6 July Communist China was mentioned as having a potential impact on Korean operations. In a National Security Council (NSC) meeting of that date, General Bradley (Chairman, JCS), in presenting the current intelligence picture, was asked by Navy Secretary Matthews about possible North Korean reinforcements. He replied, "intelligence estimated two more enemy divisions in North Korea . . . in addition to the possibility of elements, Korean or Chinese, that might be brought in from Manchuria";⁴¹ a total of 200,000 Chinese troops were reported to be in Manchuria. This was echoed by a July CIA estimate that claimed, "Communist

troop strength and dispositions would permit intervention in Korea . . . with little or no warning."⁴² General MacArthur intimated some Communist Chinese involvement in his 9 July estimate of required force levels in Korea; in praising the enemy infantry he claimed there were "unmistakable signs of Soviet leadership and technical guidance and of Chinese Communist participation."⁴³ However, at this point, the only participation by Peking being suggested was the introduction of native Koreans that had fought in the Chinese civil war. This view was sustained by further intelligence and battlefield evidence, as MacArthur indicated to Averell Harriman during their meeting in early August. Harriman relayed the assurance that these ethnic Koreans were the extent of Chicom support in a memo to President Truman.⁴⁴ However, with Inchon in the planning stages the issue of possible Soviet or Chicom intervention was raised at this meeting; MacArthur's opinion, relayed by Harriman, was that they would not. The issue was mentioned in the memo almost in passing with no elaboration, indicating the problem was, at present, secondary. This was the case: the real issue was revealed by Harriman's urging of MacArthur to obtain further evidence of Peking's direct support to North Korea in order to prevent their being seated in the UN.

Communist China Begins To Move North

Truman's vocal reassurances of America's limited aims in Korea were motivated by his earnest desire that the

conflict not escalate into general war with either the Soviets or Communist China. As the North Korean offensive sputtered and an inevitable Communist victory seemed to dissolve, Peking's position hardened both in the press and as evidenced by military action. It was the latter that concerned Truman and provided one reason for his policy of reassurances. For in early July it became apparent that Peking was repositioning troops in Manchuria, adjacent to North Korea. The CIA had noted it that month⁴⁵ and the New York Times ran three stories on July 2, 11, and 13 that intimated the massing of troops was preparatory to their entering the war.⁴⁶ While this was a somewhat premature analysis, it drew the administration's attention to the fact that Communist China could effectively influence the war. At this early juncture what was in fact occurring was the repositioning of garrison forces after the civil war. General Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army completed its redeployment to Manchuria by mid-July, after victories in South China and Hainan Island; this was prompted more by a desire to reduce military expenditures than to prepare for intervention.⁴⁷ It was these 200,000 troops that the New York Times had noted, but instead of signalling a new threat to the US in Korea they, more likely, revealed Communist China's postponement of the Taiwan invasion. Still, "the Chinese Communist regime [had given] evidence of a major reappraisal of strategy,"⁴⁸ and, though Peking's mood at this point indicated a desire to settle

issues diplomatically through the Indians and the UN, these military actions "indicated concern over the ultimate consequences of US moves."⁴⁹ Throughout July and early August CCF forces were a full month's march from the battle front; but as political statements issuing from Peking began to focus on Korea, these forces began moving to positions across the Yalu so that by 31 August General Willoughby (MacArthur's intelligence officer) reported 80,000 CCF troops along the Yalu and a total of 246,000 troops in Manchuria. While the Army's official position denied knowledge of CCF troops massing opposite North Korea,⁵⁰ the US press began warning of Peking's menacing stance.

A front-page New York Times article of 26 August put Communist China's change in its orientation before the public, a change the administration had noticed for over a week. Sealed off from Taiwan and forced to consider a North Korean defeat, Communist China, in mid-August, began to focus its attention on concern over American moves in Korea. Admitting that the war would be a prolonged one and that recent counter-attacks by the Eighth Army had created "a new stage"⁵¹ in the conflict, Communist China began to fear for the security of Manchuria, the heartland of her industry, should the US break out of Pusan and drive north. Thus, while the New York Times articles indicating impending Chinese Communist military support to North Korea appeared in late August, Peking's statements indicated that

diplomatic support was all that was initially forthcoming.⁵²

The August 4 resolution in the UN, entered by Jacob Malik, the USSR's newly returned representative, endorsed Peking's seating in the UN and a subsequent series of talks designed to end the fighting in Korea. On 20 August Chou En-lai cabled the UN with his support of this proposal although it was apparent by this time that it would be defeated. This cable had dual purposes:⁵³ one, this pressure from Communist China was intended to persuade the West that a negotiated settlement was preferable to total victory and two, it notified the world that Peking's interest was now intensely focused on Korea and the Chinese felt they had to become involved if a settlement was to be reached. It is at this point that intervention became an issue. Communist China began to hint that a widened war would bring the CCF into the conflict. Peking Radio and Jen-Min Jih Pao indicated that Communist China would not tolerate provocative acts by the US and would intervene if there was "no diplomatic settlement."⁵⁴ At the same time the communist organ, World Culture, put Peking's position clearly by stating, "American action in Korea seriously threatens the security of China . . . it is impossible to solve the Korean problem without the participation of its closest neighbor, China . . . North Korea's enemy is our enemy. North Korea's defense is our defense. North Korea's victory is our victory." This statement echoed

Chou En-lai's 20 August cable to the UN⁵⁵ and was punctuated by Malik's statement two days later that "any continuation of the Korean War will lead inevitably to a widening of the conflict."⁵⁶

Clearly the communist powers were now maneuvering as a preliminary to the possibility of a US breakout of the Pusan Perimeter. Yet what is critical is the scope of this maneuvering. Peking had shifted from a Taiwan orientation to a Korean one and had gone so far as to hint at intervention, apparently supported by the Soviet Union. It could, at this stage, still be viewed as simply a different tactic designed to acquire Taiwan's seat at the UN, yet the propagandistic blustering was being backed up by considered and forthright statements by Chou En-lai to the UN. By the end of August, as America confirmed the presence of two Chinese armies on the border and instigated the first of several air attacks on Chinese soil--due legitimately to pilot error--Chou En-lai had elevated the situation, in a protest to the State Department, to an "extremely serious" one.⁵⁷

That Communist China desired a political settlement was echoed in the tenor of its propaganda. Until late August the Resist America campaign had been only an obligatory support mechanism for its Communist neighbor, providing only moral support while taking the opportunity to decry American imperialism in Asia. The campaign had been designed to promote internal security and reconstruction as

much as anything else. It clearly "did not mobilize the populace for war in Korea"⁵⁸ which buffered the deterrent tactics Peking adopted in late August.

However, with Peking's shift in focus came a parallel shift in the tone of propaganda. Initiated by the World Culture article noted above and accentuated after US air attacks struck Chinese soil, the verbal tone became much more militant. To wit, Peking Radio broadcasted after the first attack, "we must teach them [America] a lesson . . . we are ready for action."⁵⁹ Yet, US intelligence correctly assessed the harmlessness of this propaganda. However, the incipient threat to Communist China's security posed by US forces was to be given an imminency by Inchon and created a decisive shift in the tenor of both propaganda and diplomatic communications.

Inchon Changes the War

On September 15, 1950 elements of the Tenth Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, made the famous amphibious landings at Inchon on the west coast of South Korea, adjacent to the capital, Seoul. Within four days the fabulously successful landing had advanced eastward to the outskirts of Seoul, and by 26 September the city was considered secured.⁶⁰ On the 29th General MacArthur and Syngman Rhee entered the capital to restore the exiled government. Elements of the Tenth Corps and the Eighth Army performed their planned linkup, the latter after breaking out of the Pusan Perimeter, on 26 September

effectively trapping thousands of the enemy and forcing the rest to flee north of the 38th parallel.

The utter collapse of the North Korean Army in the span of a short two week period swiftly altered the entire outlook of the war. No longer the beleaguered defenders, MacArthur's UN forces now commanded the battlefield and stood poised with the capability to enter North Korea, mop up the remnants of the enemy forces, and unify all of Korea. This rendered obsolete the standing UN policy directive that called only for the re-establishment of the South Korean regime within secure borders. It required a change in the focus of US aims in Korea and necessitated consideration of the implications that a UN drive through North Korea would have for the neighboring Communist powers.

A Search for Policy

The possibility of entering North Korea with UN forces was first considered by Truman's advisors three weeks after the outbreak of the war. Legality, they reported, had been assured by the somewhat ambiguous wording of the UN resolution that authorized the support of South Korea.⁶¹ By 1 September political consensus dictated flexibility. Too many unknowns faced the policy advisors for the formulation of a rigid policy. Feared most was the Soviet reaction which, until November, the US felt most likely, due to their apparent sponsorship of the conflict. Also, a Communist Chinese intervention was another considered

possibility. However, it was felt a Soviet intervention should be met with inaction, while a Chicom investiture of North Korea should be repulsed, if possible. Yet political advisors were not convinced that the crossing of the 38th parallel was necessary for victory; they felt a line stabilized on the parallel would be enough to force surrender terms on the North Koreans.

The JCS disagreed vehemently. Their position foresaw the "tactical considerations" that faced MacArthur after Inchon, the potential for totally destroying the North Korean Army. Their views prevailed, to a degree. On the 9th of September the final policy proposal, with the JCS's input, was put before Truman; he approved it two days later. On 15 September, the JCS cabled MacArthur an advance copy of the policy as it related to tactical operations then ongoing. His objective was now "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces," and operations above the parallel were authorized provided there was:⁶²

- (1) No entry into North Korea of major Soviet or Communist Chinese forces.
- (2) No announcement of the intended entry of such forces.
- (3) No threat by Russians or Chinese Communists to counter our operations militarily in North Korea.

MacArthur received the gist of the new directive while afloat off Inchon. Since he was tied up with the imminent landing, MacArthur's reply simply requested a formal copy

of the policy be forwarded as quickly as possible, once available. However, due to political roadblocks, the formal directive did not arrive until 27 September. One of these impediments was the resignation of Louis Johnson as Secretary of Defense and the appointment of George Marshall as his successor. Johnson's resignation was, according to some, made at the request of the President;⁶³ others felt Johnson had resigned in support of hawkish statements made by Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews and other military men.⁶⁴ When finally dispatched the new policy heavily caveated MacArthur's military operations in North Korea.⁶⁵ He was instructed that in the event the Soviets should enter the war, all action was to cease and Washington was to be informed immediately. Further, should Communist China announce its intent to occupy North Korea, or otherwise intervene, and "give warning, either explicitly or implicitly . . . you should refer the matter immediately to Washington." Policy distinguished, at this stage, between a Chinese and a Soviet response to the war. A Communist Chinese response to operations in North Korea could be met with military force, the JCS told MacArthur, "as long as action by your forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance"; the employment of small units, introduced covertly, did not apply, for only major units fit this definition. Also, as "a matter of policy" no incursions into Manchuria were to be allowed and only ROK forces employed in operations along the border.⁶⁶

Re-emphasizing the President's concerns of a widened war, the JCS amplified the formal statement by ordering MacArthur to "make special efforts to determine whether there is a Chinese Communist or Soviet threat to the attainment of your objectives" and if so to report it to the JCS "as a matter of urgency." Due to an obvious wariness about Communist intentions the message warned MacArthur that "these instructions, however, cannot be considered final since they may require modification in accordance with developments."⁶⁷

This last statement was to cause problems between the perceptions held by CINCFE and the JCS as to the scope of authority vested in MacArthur by the directive. Truman's memoirs make no mention of this directive having a tenuous duration, based on the lack of knowledge about Communist intentions. In fact, he saw it as definitive guidance stating that, "no ground operations were to take place"⁶⁸ if Peking or Moscow intervened. A further ambiguity was to exacerbate the uncertainty of the directive. Secretary of Defense Marshall sought to restrict any discussion of crossing the parallel in the UN. The issue of legality would require a ballot to approve the action and Marshall, and the administration as a whole, wanted the crossing to be a fait accompli. Press reports indicated General Walker had stopped at the 38th parallel to await "permission to cross," and had thus jeopardized the immediate pursuit of the North Korean army. Therefore, Marshall told MacArthur,

"We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel," so as to make clear the parallel was not at issue, and told MacArthur to silence any talk in his command about the legality of the crossing.⁶⁹ This, in effect, softened the JCS directive to MacArthur and was to allow MacArthur a free hand throughout Korea at a critical future juncture, a position made clear in his response to Marshall that "I regard all of Korea open for our military operations."⁷⁰ Here the chain of command appeared to cloud the tenets of an otherwise specific directive; it was a situation favorable to CINCPAC's desires for freedom of interference from Washington and, according to Acheson, it gave encouragement to MacArthur's "adventurism."⁷¹ Still, the JCS ordered MacArthur to submit his plans for continuing pursuit of the enemy across the parallel; he did so on 28 September and began implementation immediately, also informing the JCS that there was "no indication" of the entry of major Sino-Soviet units.⁷²

Heightened Concern Over Communist China

As is abundantly clear from the NSC 81/1 directive issued to MacArthur, the administration was becoming deeply concerned over Peking's intentions. The reason can be seen from this Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) received from General Willoughby on 31 August:

... sources have reported troop movements from central China to Manchuria for some time which suggests movements preliminary to entering the Korean theater.⁷³

This was punctuated by reports from Nationalist Chinese sources that four CCF Armies were moving towards Korea⁷⁴ and warnings by respected analysts, like State's George Kennan, that crossing the 38th parallel would cause Peking to intervene.⁷⁵ The CIA's estimate claimed that Chinese intervention was "likely in some form" but supported the Intelligence Community's consensus opinion that it would take the form of covert action only.⁷⁶

Because of these indicators, the State Department continued to seek evidence of Chinese intentions through the Indian government as, according to Acheson, "earlier Chinese movements into Manchuria had established a means of intervention."⁷⁷ Here the US fully recognized that Peking's actions on the diplomatic level were being supplemented by viable military alternatives to retain flexibility and, very likely, credibility. Panikkar faithfully reported Chou En-lai's desire for a peaceful settlement based on mediation, and the State Department applied this knowledge in its analysis. Only George Kennan's voice in the Department's Policy Planning Staff discounted the input and warned of a negative military oriented reaction.⁷⁸ Thus, to Truman's numerous explanations of America's limited aims in Korea, Acheson, in response to Peking's hardening position, warned the Chinese Communists that "it would be sheer madness" for them to intervene.⁷⁹ America also surfaced the sponsorship by the Chinese Communists of the sending to

Korea of ethnic North Korean forces, members of the CCF for all intents and purposes. This was the first formal allegation of direct support being provided by Peking to North Korea.⁸⁰ While these statements were more inflammatory than others, their purpose was only to warn the Communist Chinese not to interfere. Rather, they had the opposite effect of heightening Peking's fear of American intentions.

Peking's Position Solidifies

Whether the Inchon landing and the subsequent decision to pursue the fleeing North Koreans above the parallel caused Peking to opt for a military solution to Korea is not known. Some feel the decision was reached in August during Sino-Soviet talks between Mao and Molotov, as alluded to in Willoughby's DIS of 30 September and picked up by the New York Times.⁸¹ Whether this is true or false, the events preceding and after the landing surely solidified Communist China's fears that the US appeared to be maneuvering for an attack on Manchuria. There were certainly numerous indications.

The appeasing tone of the Americans had recently turned harsh. Statements by highly placed American officials called for an aggressive policy against the Communist bloc. Though they can be explained as rebuttals to the belligerent tones in Chou En-lai's 20 August cable and Malik's speech of 22 August, they nonetheless caught the attention of a Communist China that closely watched the

American press for clues to US intentions.⁸² The Chinese heard Navy Secretary Matthews call for "a war to compel cooperation for peace," claiming the US should "become the first aggressors for peace."⁸³ Similarly, Major General Orvil A. Anderson urged a preventive war against the bloc, claiming he could deliver a knockout blow to the Soviets' nuclear capability immediately.⁸⁴ The White House swiftly repudiated the statements, causing Anderson to be suspended and, it is speculated, asking for Defense Secretary Johnson's resignation due to his support of Matthews's statements.⁸⁵ Speeches by Truman and Acheson reiterated the purely defensive aims of the US. Yet even in these words Peking heard distressing comments. Both President Truman and UN Ambassador Austin issued veiled warnings against "other armies and governments" becoming involved in Korea and fighting "spread into a general war."⁸⁶ Intended to reassure Peking, the statements had the opposite effect again. And of course, Truman could do little about statements from President Rhee of South Korea such as, "We have to advance to the Manchurian border . . . we will not allow ourselves to stop."⁸⁷ Finally, the most credible source of Peking's apprehensions as to US intent was the Supreme Commander, Douglas MacArthur.

Conflict between MacArthur and Washington was later to cause his relief as commander in Korea, but the incidences that led to that point had their origin during this time

and produced an alarming effect on Communist China. Bryce Denno lists MacArthur's aggressive stance as the major cause of the Chinese intervention;⁸⁸ he has provided ample evidence. Examples included MacArthur's well-known enmity for Communist China and his admiration of Chiang Kai-shek. In meetings with the Nationalist leader in July, MacArthur dubbed Taiwan "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" that should become part of a defense link "to dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore."⁸⁹ After the meeting he called for preemptive bombings of Communist Chinese airfields opposite Taiwan. Chiang confirmed MacArthur's statements when he claimed their talks had "laid the foundation" for mutual cooperation "to secure the final victory against the communists."⁹⁰ While Truman ordered MacArthur to publicly retract inflammatory statements that ran contrary to his policies, Peking saw only a belligerent MacArthur remaining at his post. This raised MacArthur to a man with "considerable influence and independence"⁹¹ and caused, according to Tsou, "the cumulative anxieties of China's leaders to focus on their image of an aggressive General MacArthur." ⁹² Thus academic consensus believes it was very likely that Peking's sense of immediate danger was enhanced by MacArthur's actions during this period.

Communist China now believed it had solid evidence that the US push into North Korea was following the Japanese blueprint for invading Manchuria. Truman's conciliatory

statements could easily be considered a smoke screen in light of the aggressive tone of other prominent sources that leaked into the press. Accentuating this were air attacks on Chinese territory that had killed three, injured twenty-one, and caused considerable damage in Antung, just across the Yalu River. Further, the UN defeated three resolutions that sought to seat Peking, to initiate a cease-fire, and to consider airspace violations. All this occurred in the first three weeks of September. Finally, the US stood ready for the invasion of North Korea, an invasion that was assured of success by the disintegration of the North Korean army. Thus, even though the US had apologized for the bombings and offered to pay reparations,⁹³ Communist China's pronouncements took on a more hostile tone in an effort to ward off the United States.

On September 22 Peking admitted to sending native Koreans to the fighting, implying more assistance would be forthcoming, declaring they "will always stand on the side of the Korean people."⁹⁴ The CCF Chief of Staff, General Nieh Jung-chen, informed Indian Ambassador Panikkar that Communist China will not "sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come to the border."⁹⁵ He also discounted America's nuclear capability, claiming "they may kill a few million people" but "they cannot defeat us on land."⁹⁶ On September 24 Chou En-lai sent the UN a formal protest for the US air attacks, worded in such a way

as to go far beyond a simple protest, and thus defined Peking's position:

The case is even more serious than strafings . . . and exposes more clearly than ever the determination of the United States to extend aggressive war against Korea . . . and to extend further her aggression against China. The flames of war being extended by the United States in the East are burning more fiercely . . . [the UN] is lighting up the war-flames in the East.⁹⁷

These "flames of war" were clarified by Nieh's statement above and by Chou's first official warning extended six days later in a speech to the Central People's Government Council, where he made specific reference to the crossing of the 38th parallel as casus belli for intervention by the Chinese:

The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists.⁹⁸

Communist China's propaganda now turned utterly hostile and "in content and extent" became "significant as the first clear mobilization [of China] . . . for possible military actions."⁹⁹ A wave of mass rallies sparked unprecedented outbursts of anti-Americanism, characterizing the US as "a mad dog" whose "blood-swollen eyes cast around for something further to attack." Speakers no longer used the passive resistance term "fan tui" but now exhorted action by using "k'ang yi", a more decisive term previously used in fighting against Japan. Peking published MacArthur's and Matthews's statements as proof of a coverup of US intentions. While defensive in nature, this more resolute propaganda supported diplomatic statements in the

true Chinese Communist style; it prepared them for future eventualities.

Conclusion

This period clearly saw America falling further into its own trap by providing Communist China with behavior that only reinforced the fear of US intentions. Though happenstance and unplanned, the sequence of events pointed in only one direction, from the Chinese perspective: the invasion of Manchuria. This was the heartland of Peking's industry, with the potential to become the "Ruhr of Asia."¹⁰⁰ To secure this area was to dominate Communist China, a desire now being exhibited by America through Peking's eyes. As if to substantiate an unknown, Moscow cabled Peking after the Inchon landing with a warning that after the successful Russian revolution Western forces invaded the USSR, intimating that MacArthur and Chiang were conspiring to do the same.¹⁰¹ In response, Communist China moved two more Field Armies into Manchuria to supplement the two already in place. Whether Mao and Chou truly believed America would attack Manchuria is unknown, but military preparations certainly reflected a perception of a threat to Communist China's national interests in Manchuria and its revolutionary interests in Asia. Clearly, their diplomatic communications indicated a complete reappraisal of Communist China's "commitments to its interests and its duties, its estimate of the external

threat, and its [foreboding] appraisal of American intentions."102

The American and Chinese reversals during this period had a dramatic impact on the military situation and reflected a significant diplomatic turn of events. Militarily, the Korean War's resolution was in the grasp of the UN Command and was seen as only weeks away, whereas only a short time before UN troops had been fighting for their very survival. However, Communist China had come 180 degrees diplomatically in its attitudes concerning Korea. This period ended with a veiled warning that the Communist Chinese, initially unconcerned, would intervene if North Korea was attacked. Initially Sino-Soviet policy appeared to use this as a deterrent to the American policy once the imminent breakout of the Pusan Perimeter was achieved. However, after Inchon, the apparent bluffing altered to indications of distinct preparations for some form of intervention. Accordingly, events would now impact with more ominous overtones and accelerate much more rapidly.

CHAPTER 4

The Guns Sound

The period of the Korean War that ended in September was characterized by the reversal of American military fortunes and Communist China's orientation towards Korea. October would be the month that would see Communist and American policies result in clashes on the battlefield. It was to be a period of decisive events. Verbal hostility and bold-faced warnings characterized the first half of the period; the initiation of military hostilities punctuated the end of it. Communist China realized that a political solution was not possible and on 14 October began infiltrating CCF divisions into North Korea. Here Peking's overall strategy turned to the support of tactical success. Overt statements on intervention ceased, battlefield actions were to become the focal point for communication. Surprise was necessary to overcome vastly superior American firepower; the government played its part by remaining relatively quiet.

American intelligence efforts would now begin gleaning hints of a possible Chicom intervention. Yet the intelligence would be deemed inconclusive. This discounting of available intelligence would establish a pattern that, in the end, would allow Peking to achieve a complete tactical surprise. The first contact between the CCF and UN forces occurred on 26 October, Washington time.

However, the inevitability of that contact was revealed at the opening of this tenth month of 1950.

China Warns the United States

With UN forces committed to a drive into North Korea, Chou En-lai sought out one of the only direct lines of communication to the West available to him in an effort to suspend the action. On October 2 at ten minutes after midnight, he summoned K.M. Panikkar to a meeting. Knowing his words would be relayed to the US, he defined specifically for Panikkar the casus belli for Chicom intervention. He boldly declared that "should US troops invade North Korean territory China would enter the war"¹ and he was emphatic: "'The South Koreans did not matter but American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese resistance.'"² Within hours of the meeting, reports began reaching Washington from American embassies worldwide that relayed the warning of impending Communist Chinese intervention. The warning had been motivated by the events of 1 October. ROK forces had crossed the 38th parallel on the east coast of Korea in pursuit of the retreating enemy. That same day, MacArthur broadcast from Tokyo a call to North Korea to lay down its arms and surrender;³ Chou En-lai had endeavored to answer the surrender demand but it was to go unheeded.

US Reaction to the Warning

There were several reasons for the Americans to

discount Chou's warning; one can be phrased the military optimism of the moment. Flush with resounding victory in the South, the US now sought to unify all of Korea. The enemy was on the run everywhere, even in the UN where on the same day as Chou's warning, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky offered a cease-fire plan that sought the withdrawal of all foreign troops and country-wide elections.⁴ This was simple diplomatic bargaining from the underdog position; the US revelled in it. Plans were being drawn for the redeployment of troops and, indeed, some new units and replacements bound for Korea were halted,⁵ to include allied units earmarked for employment. The time for successful intervention was past, it was felt, and optimism about concluding the war was to influence the judgement of many senior officers in the next few weeks.

Second, the Truman administration discounted the warning as a bluff. Truman felt Communist China was attempting to blackmail the UN, whose vote was pending on the resolution to reunify all of Korea.⁶ Panikkar as the source of the communique was, as has been noted, entirely suspect as to his loyalties and motivation. According to Truman, "Mr. Panikkar had in the past played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly, so that his statement could not be taken as that of an impartial observer"; it might have been "no more than a relay of communist propaganda."⁷ Secretary of State Acheson felt

that warning, in conjunction with Vyshinsky's proposal, showed that a combined "effort was being made to save the North Korean regime."⁸ He admitted "Chou's words were a warning, not to be discarded," but were not "an authoritative statement of policy."⁹ Thus Peking's attempt to stop the incursion fell into a credibility gap; the source was suspect and the timing minimized the impact.

But, if there was consensus at the top levels of the administration, it was not necessarily reflected at the analyst level. George Kennan's views have been alluded to, but other lower level officials in both military intelligence and the State Department shared Kennan's misgivings at crossing into North Korea. Memoranda from the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Mr. Clubb) and the Deputy Director of the Office of North East Asian Affairs (Mr. Johnson) informed Dean Rusk (the Undersecretary) that "the Chou En-lai demarche cannot safely be regarded as a mere bluff"; due to the lateness of the meeting Clubb felt "Peiping (sic) may be prepared to take considerable risks."¹⁰ Similarly, "I do not feel that we can assume it is entirely bluff," was Johnson's position.¹¹ These sentiments were reflected in Acheson's comments, but in a telegram of 4 October he called Panikkar "dubiously reliable," thus revealing his true opinion of the Indian Ambassador's credibility.¹²

Far East Command's intelligence element also noted a change in the tenor of Peking's actions that appeared to

correspond with Chou's warnings. In a 5 October DIS, Willoughby's subordinates noted that the "purported" entry into North Korea of nine CCF divisions created a new situation with a "sinister connotation."¹³ The report concluded that the potential "exists for Chinese Communist forces to openly intervene."¹¹ This report also confirmed that between 9 and 18 of the 38 CCF divisions in Manchuria were massing along the Yalu and stated that the report of the action "appears conclusive."¹⁴ Yet by mid-month Willoughby would comment that the Chinese verbal warnings "were probably in a category of diplomatic blackmail."¹⁵ Thus the loop was closed as far as the opinions of the highest level political and military advisors that served Truman and MacArthur were concerned. The warning lacked credibility and amounted to mere military posturing and verbal jousting that was not to be taken seriously.

America Calls the Bluff

On 7 October elements of the Eighth Army, the First Cavalry Division, crossed the 38th parallel and struck north according to MacArthur's plan; at the same time General Almond's Tenth Corps was preparing to conduct another amphibious assault on the east coast of North Korea. The pursuit of the enemy was on in earnest. By the 15th, the North Korean capital of Pyongyang was threatened, and the overall success of the offensive began to allow

thoughts of a Christmas in Japan for many of the troops.¹⁶

Concurrent with American units crossing into North Korea, the UN passed a resolution that authorized UN forces entry into North Korea for the purpose of taking "all appropriate steps to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea."¹⁷ Yet as reports of Chinese warnings continued to trickle in from embassies in Moscow, Stockholm, and New Delhi, Truman felt the need to reiterate his policy to MacArthur should Peking intervene; echoing his earlier directive, he told MacArthur to meet any Chinese threat so "long as action by your command offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance."¹⁸

On 9 October, UN aircraft inadvertently attacked a Soviet air base 100 miles into Soviet territory due, again, to "navigation errors."¹⁹ Again, the US offered to pay for any damage. At the same time the exiled North Korean government of Kim Il-sung publicly broadcast its thanks to the Communist Chinese for their aid in the conflict. This was significant in that for the first time these appreciations made no concurrent mention of the Soviet Union.²⁰

Concurrent with these events, the CIA provided President Truman with its latest estimate. It put aside its past position that only covert assistance would be forthcoming from Peking. It claimed that the CCF could intervene "effectively but not necessarily decisively" and

that "despite statements by Chou En-lai, troop movements to Manchuria, and [warlike] propaganda" there were still no "convincing indications" that the Chinese were considering intervention.²¹ The CIA told Truman it was too late for effective intervention. These disturbing incidences provided one of the motivations for Truman's decision to visit MacArthur in person. He claimed that he needed to "get the benefit of his firsthand information and judgement" concerning a possible Chinese move into Korea.²² He resolved to meet MacArthur on Wake Island at mid-month.

Just prior to his leaving for the now famous rendezvous, the Communist Chinese issued their final verbal warning. On 11 October, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued this statement:

Now that the American forces are attempting to cross the thirty-eighth parallel on a large scale, the Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a serious situation . . . [US forces now pose] a serious menace to the security of China.²³

On 14 October, as Truman was enroute to Wake, the CCF began infiltrating 180,000 men across the Yalu River to take up positions in the hills of North Korea and await MacArthur's forces.²⁴

Wake Island

Many feel Truman's Wake Island trip was ill conceived and ill timed. Manchester claims the results of the meeting were inconclusive and pointless. Acheson begged off on the trip claiming that "while General MacArthur had many of

the attributes of a foreign sovereign, . . . and was quite as difficult as any, it did not seem wise to recognize him as one."²⁵ But it was Phillip Jessup whose insight warned that a meeting with MacArthur would broadcast US intentions to make a major move in Asia, thus exacerbating Peking's fears of an invasion.²⁶ Still, Truman felt it was time to meet the legend face to face to iron out any differences of opinion (read, enforce his opinion) and insure that US policies in Asia remained consistent.

A detailed account of the 15 October meeting is not part of the warning issue. But some significant aspects of the meeting did impact on this topic. First, during discussions Truman asked MacArthur point-blank if the Chinese Communists would intervene. There is controversy surrounding this segment of the discussions, as there is controversy over the meeting as a whole. Truman claims this was a major reason for traveling to the Pacific (see above), while MacArthur claims the question came near the end of the round table discussions and appeared to be an afterthought.²⁷ Truman claims MacArthur reassured him that there would be no large scale intervention by the Chinese Communists;²⁸ the General contends that he was asked for an opinion and, because the situation was still largely unknown, he offered a qualified opinion.²⁹ What he did tell Truman was that he did not think Peking would intervene, but if it did, "there would be the greatest slaughter."³⁰ The discourse had a dual significance: it

provided Truman with what turned out to be a false sense of security, and it showed the detailed knowledge MacArthur's intelligence arm had obtained on CCF troop dispositions (he recounted these at some length before finally answering Truman's question, as part of his qualification).³¹ It is historically ironic that literally as MacArthur was speaking these words, the CCF was accomplishing the fact.

Second, on 17 October, Ambassador Chapin (US Ambassador, Netherlands) reported to Secretary Acheson exactly what Jessup had feared.³² Chapin relayed the information that the Netherlands' Peking Charge had reported the Communist Chinese seeing this meeting as the opening of the "final phase" leading towards US aggression against China. This is indicative of the stated Communist Chinese position that UN forces threatened the security of Manchuria. It also represents the types of intelligence sources available to analysts in Washington. The final warning by the Chinese on 10 October would be followed by a dearth of further pronouncements. Intelligence inputs from this point on would have to rely largely on sifting propaganda, monitoring troop movements, and listening to diplomatic traffic similar to Chapin's report above.

Finally, President Truman's speech in San Francisco on 17 October provided the last item of significance concerning the conference. This speech was duly timed to celebrate the anniversary of the founding of the UN, in the city of its birth. One of its purposes was to communicate

to Peking the non-aggression policy the US maintained in Korea. This Truman communicated well, but interjected within the speech were statements that negated any positive results from the speech. What caused this was statements made by Truman that could be totally misread by the Communist Chinese such as, "I want to see world peace" both east and west of Wake Island "and we are going to get it." Also, Korea served as a "step forward in the age-old struggle to establish the rule of law in the world."³³ Beyond these statements with undertones of aggressive intent, Truman confirmed US plans for the conquest/liberation of Korea. The choice of words here depends on the listener's perspective at the time, Chinese or American. What is clear is that the Wake Island meeting resulted in few positive outcomes. For the Chinese it only foretold of ominous events; for the US it only served to put a temporary lid on the boiling pot that was the MacArthur-Washington relationship.

UN Forces Drive to the Yalu

With the help of the airborne insertion of the 187th Regimental Combat Team and the amphibious landing of the Tenth Corps in Wonsan, MacArthur's forces continued to march north towards the Manchurian border. By 19 October, Pyongyang had fallen and advance ROK elements had reached the restraining line, agreed to by the JCS and MacArthur, beyond which only ROK forces would operate.³⁴ The successes were fulfilling, with all allied forces sharing

in the victory. The often sluggish ROK's in Walker's Eighth Army had moved north so fast that they almost rendered unnecessary the Tenth Corps amphibious envelopment. MacArthur had informed the President that, if successful, units could be relieved in time for the Christmas holidays.³⁵

The successes of the ground forces could not, however, dispel further indications of ominous Chinese activity. On 13 October the Netherlands Embassy reported from "reliable sources" that four CCF divisions had crossed into Korea.³⁶ Also, the American Consul General in Hong Kong reported renewed Communist Chinese warnings days after the UN had crossed the 38th parallel, that they would not "stand idly by."³⁷ Four days later aerial reconnaissance spotted 100 Soviet-built fighters just across the Yalu. General Stratemeyer, commanding MacArthur's air assets, minimized this finding by telling Washington this new threat was only there to lend "color and credence to menacing statements" of the Chinese Communist leaders.³⁸ On 20 October the CIA revised again its estimate of Chinese intentions. It now contended that the CCF would move far enough into Korea to secure Suiho and other power plants along the Yalu (the major energy supplies for Manchuria). True to his non-aggression policy, Truman requested that MacArthur announce his intentions not to interfere with the installations.³⁹ MacArthur declined the President's recommendation in order

to maintain tactical flexibility should the plants be found to support "hostile military purposes."⁴⁰ Despite mounting evidence of this nature, the Pentagon was still convinced that the lateness of the hour indicated that Peking had decided not to intervene; the State Department concurred, but both agencies felt the question had not fully been resolved.⁴¹

MacArthur Defies the Directive

With available intelligence and his own opinion to motivate him, MacArthur opened the drive to the Yalu anew on 24 October. He told his commanders, without warning Washington, to "drive forward with all speed and full utilization of their forces" to the border of North Korea. This was in direct violation of the 27 September policy directive that authorized only the use of ROK forces in the northern provinces of Korea.⁴² Or was it?

The JCS was miffed. To that body the September directive had been clear: no American forces were to be employed near the border. They objected in the form of an inquiry: "While the Joint Chiefs of Staff realize that you undoubtedly had sound reasons for issuing these instructions they would like to be informed of them as your action is a matter of some concern here."⁴³ The tone of this acquiescent reproach underscores the continuing tensions that exist between the corporate body and the field commander.

MacArthur's reply typified his superior attitude and

cleverly played upon the ambiguities in the directive issued to him. MacArthur justified the uncharacteristic change in standing orders by claiming:

- (1) The directive as indicated by the JCS had not been "final" but depended on events.
- (2) ROK forces were too weak and poorly led to complete the mission.
- (3) Secretary Marshall's message allowing MacArthur to feel "unhampered" superseded the JCS directive.
- (4) The directive dictated the non-use of American soldiers only as "a matter of policy" and therefore implied it was not a direct order.⁴⁴

CINCFE made no effort to placate the JCS, only calmly enforced his position by stating "this entire subject was covered in my conference at Wake Island."⁴⁵ The JCS allowed the orders to stand.

Secretary Acheson was furious.⁴⁶ All the innumerable attempts to ward off a negative Communist reaction could now be jeopardized by this action. To CINCFE's claim that the directive might later be amended, Acheson quips, "a proposition true also of the Constitution of the United States"; Acheson contends the use of ROK's as "a matter of policy" meant as a matter of US policy, not "generally." Had MacArthur blatantly defied the directive, as Acheson suggests, or had he molded it to his own image of its meaning? Whatever the case, the end of October saw a two-pronged UN assault driving north, segmented by almost impassable terrain that caused a discontinuous front line, allowing only haphazard communication between headquarters, and moving, it was felt, into the final phase of the Korean War.⁴⁷

Communist China Strikes

Between 14 October and the end of the month some 200,000 Chinese volunteers entered Korea. Exploiting gaps in units and seeking situations where superiority in numbers prevailed, the CCF struck on 26 October. Initial contacts during the end of October were limited to clashes with the ROK divisions on the flank of the Eighth Army push north and the lead ROK elements of the Tenth Corps in the east. In the Eighth Army area they were decisive.⁴⁸ The first action ambushed and decimated an entire ROK battalion of the 6th ROK Division; this unit had moved up to positions overlooking the Yalu ahead of the main body. Next the division's main body was struck and, along with the rest of the ROK II Corps, forced to retire some 45 miles below the border. The question of Chinese intervention appeared a moot point, but Communist tactics at home made this difficult to perceive.

Communist China's propaganda effort to prepare the country for war commenced on 10 October with the Foreign Office's final warning being given public prominence in editorials in World Culture and Jen-Min Jih Pao.⁴⁹ While this was picked up by the Hong Kong Consular General (as noted above), there appeared little else; the major governmental organs fell silent for the next two weeks, presumably for security reasons. But internal publications resumed the "war alert" of late September with a massive campaign making numerous specific references to defending

Communist Chinese to allow them to claim they had made good on their promise to aid North Korea.⁵⁶ General Bradley was confused by the half measures taken by an element which, according to intelligence, had a far greater capability on and near the Manchurian border. This activity just did not fit into normal standards for the conduct of combat operations. The Eighth Army's Walker explained it away as only piecemeal reinforcements for North Korean units.

While there were two other highly interesting intelligence inputs at month's end (Hong Kong reported that at an August meeting military intervention was approved and MIG-15 jets appeared in the skies for the first time), the intelligence elements concerned, specifically Willoughby's staff, concluded "there is no positive evidence that Chinese Communist units, as such, have entered Korea," reasoning also that the appropriate "time for intervention has long since passed."⁵⁷ If the Communist Chinese had been seeking to convey a further warning to the US they obviously failed. The intelligence estimates mirrored the confusion of events. That they downplayed them was a reflection of the astonishment felt in most circles that the Chinese would be so foolhardy as to intervene at a time when the issue had already been decided. More importantly, the intelligence, if it was considered in a "worst case" scenario, would most certainly have had an effect on continuing the current offensive. This was an option that,

apparently, no senior officer in Korea wanted to articulate.

Conclusion

October was a decisive month. The belligerent tones of Communist pronouncements had escalated to point-blank warnings to the US not to enter North Korea lest the CCF be forced to intervene. These dramatic warnings, stripped of the usual ambiguity of diplomatic dialogue, accurately delineated Communist Chinese intent. Yet just as decisive was the Americans' refusal to lend credibility to the warnings. Whiting believes this justifiable given the circumstances.⁵⁸ Peking believed it had clearly and credibly enunciated its position. This is supported by evidence of heightened US concern over the possibility of an intervention (the 29 September directive enjoined MacArthur to pay particular attention to evidence of Chinese intent in this direction) and directives detailing how to deal with it (on 9 October the JCS reiterated the policy of "continued resistance" as long as a reasonable chance for success remains). However, an element of bluff could logically be claimed inherent in Chou's warnings of early October as the military balance of power and initiative lay with UN forces and the timing of the warnings clearly associated them with back-pedaling Soviet measures to obtain a cease-fire in the UN to slow the allied advance. Too, the selection of the source of the transmission, a "neutralist" India, was ill conceived as

Korea. Then, on the eve of hostilities, the major publications resumed the externally published attack on American imperialist intentions, claiming the US was "following in the footsteps of the Japanese predecessors."⁵⁰ World Culture now employed readily the action phrase "k'ang yi," thus marking a transition from partial to full mobilization of public opinion. That it coincided with the first contacts between the CCF and UN forces cannot be considered happenstance.⁵¹ Though, uncharacteristically, no mention was made of the combat in Korea, it was clear that the propaganda had now shifted onto a wartime footing.

Peking's motivations for these limited attacks cannot be fully known, but there are two justifications.⁵² The lack of military superiority in both men and equipment forced the CCF to be selective of their targets to decrease their vulnerability to retaliation by UN aircraft. Also, the Chinese were apparently testing the reactions of the Americans to this new threat, thus, in effect, using military forces to convey a further warning. One reason for this latter justification is that the CCF needed time to assemble in more credible numbers before attempting more ambitious operations; the UN forces numbered 440,000 troops, while the CCF had only half that in Korea by the end of October. Yet whatever the reason, and the second is the most probable, the Communist Chinese had definitively signalled their intention to enter the war.

American Reactions

By 31 October the fact that Communist China had forces in North Korea became apparent. Some twenty-five prisoners of war (POW) had been taken, and interrogation revealed they had come from elements belonging to five CCF divisions. Stunned by this development, senior officers made personal efforts to confirm the identity of these troops as Chinese. Generals Paik Sun Yup (ROK) and Almond (X Corps) personally interrogated the first POW's. They readily offered information on their nocturnal crossing of the Yalu and the identification of their units, too readily for the Americans. At first they discounted the information, but they soon learned that the CCF had become victims of their own propaganda and lack of training.⁵³ Told they would be tortured and killed if captured, they had received no guidance on the need for silence if they were captured. Once they realized they were not to be killed, they readily talked to the Americans.

The US now had compelling evidence of some form of intervention, but because it did not fit into any contingency plans for various forms of intervention it puzzled analysts and commanders.⁵⁴ The resulting estimates tended to downplay the facts. General Almond was convinced that no matter what the scope of the intervention, it was too late to influence the battle,⁵⁵ while the Army Chief of Staff, General Lawton Collins, saw this limited action as a face-saving gesture on the part of the

that government, through its actions concerning Korea, had become suspect in the Western camp. Thus the failure of the October warnings, and even possibly the confusion surrounding the first hostile contacts, can be explained to some extent.

Still, that some form of Communist Chinese intervention was factually established by 31 October was also decisive. If the POW's on hand offered the only solid proof, they would have been sufficient. The facts could not have been refuted. Why were they discounted? The thesis that the intelligence available was not the intelligence that commanders in Korea wanted to hear has some application to this situation. This implies that MacArthur, at this point, deliberately disregarded hard intelligence in order to sustain his offensive and gain ultimate victory. The available evidence does not support this single emphatic conclusion. Still, the fact that irrefutable evidence was explained away was in and of itself decisive in regards to the warning issue for it set a precedent and established a pattern of perceptions, prompted by the flush of imminent victory and a distinct belief in the invincibility of MacArthur's judgement, that would not be overcome until the events of November 1950 culminated in a massive Communist counter-strike.

CHAPTER 5
"An Entirely New War"

During the period from 1 November until the Chicom counterattack, the US position became more confused. Early in November American units became the targets of CCF attacks in a continuation of the initial thrusts of late October. Again, they were decisive, but more costly to the Communist forces. Consequently, just as quickly as they had appeared, the CCF disappeared. Intelligence and political estimates reflected the obvious intervention and accumulated large amounts of supporting information, but the conclusions were weak. Why? It appears the major reason for this was the three-week lull in hostile contact prior to the counteroffensive. This break in contact came at a critical juncture. Washington realized that some reappraisal of plans was required, but the apparent cessation of hostilities caused them to be watered down. There existed still a "great reluctance. . . to accept this intervention at face value."¹ Apparently the one key item missing was solid evidence of Communist Chinese intent.

For their part, the Communist Chinese were now oriented towards war and, thus, there were now few October style pronouncements indicating their overall plans. However, there were specific references to Peking's intentions within the masses of information available. But again,

they were reported but not included in final estimates. Masterful use of deception and camouflage offered the US largely peripheral indicators of the scope of the Chinese build-up. These will be examined and analyzed.

Critical, also, to this period were US misgivings about the vulnerabilities of the ground forces as positioned. Attempts to rectify these weaknesses became interwoven into efforts to seek an optimal reappraisal of the mission in Korea. The resulting options were affected by their interpretability as attempts to control the war from Washington and the regained optimism caused by the lull in the fighting. Yet America was apparently fully aware of the threat that faced it; it remains to be seen whether the actions taken based on the available warning were adequate to the circumstances confronted.

China Ups the Ante

On 1 November General Walker rushed elements of the First Cavalry Division to the aid of the retreating ROK forces. As part of a continuation of October's initial thrusts, the CCF ambushed elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment and very nearly destroyed them.² In the Tenth Corps area in the east, halted ROK forces were reinforced by the 7th Marine Regiment, which fought a five-day battle before forcing the CCF to retire. Communist victory in the west and stalemate with the Marines in the east was accomplished by the introduction of multi-divisional sized CCF assets. The fighting continued through the first week

of November and then suddenly stopped. However, one reason for this was that MacArthur's advance also halted to take stock of the new situation. The intelligence now pouring in validated the "sinister connotations" that the threat posed only weeks before. One result was that all thoughts of halting reinforcements bound for Korea were eradicated. The FEC personnel officer (General Beiderlinden) now screamed desperately for replacements; casualties had risen from 40 per day in October to 326 per day since November's inception.

Intelligence Hardens

On the second of November the first intelligence estimates since the intervention were developed by MacArthur's G-2 staff. They reflected the same-day pronouncement from Peking that a "volunteer corps" had been sent into Korea to protect the Hydroelectric Zone.³ FEC, G-2 reported some 16,500 Communist Chinese soldiers had entered the fighting and appeared to compose units quickly combined into task forces that ordinarily did not work together. The numbers of the units ran contrary to known order of battle (55th, 56th units are examples), whereas POW interrogations identified individuals as being members of a variety of known divisions, armies, and Field Armies. This piecemeal introduction of forces prompted General Willoughby to conclude that Peking was:⁴

(1) Saving face by intervening in a small way as it had promised.

(2) Possibly attempting to alter the CCF structure in order to deny the defeat of the country in the event of failure.

(3) Providing an opportunity to claim they helped North Korea to enhance standing in the Communist bloc.

Still, Willoughby closed with a caveat, "should a high level decision dictate, the deployed strength of 29 divisions could quickly conduct a major attack."⁵

Disturbing reports of just such a high level meeting, only hinted at in previous DIS's, now flowed in from a variety of sources. Reports indicated that the initial decision to position troops for a possible intervention was made in August (see NYT, 17 August) and the final decision to send Lin Piao's forces into North Korea had been made in mid-October during a conference in Peking; DIS #2986 indicated this was "probably true."⁶ That it had taken so long to intervene was due to the necessity to remove major industrial plants from Manchuria, the reports indicated. ⁷ Notably missing from reports of these meetings was what Peking intended to do once in Korea.

However, diplomatic channels provided revelations regarding this issue. On 6 November, the Netherlands' Charge in Peking informed the State Department that the Communist Chinese intended to "throw the book" at the US in Korea.⁸ The use of this peculiarly English vernacular is puzzling until an identical message is obtained (from Nationalist Chinese sources) and reported through the FEC, G-2 channels.⁹ The intended meaning of the word is clear; the use of dual channels, if intentional on Peking's part, significant. Further, Panikkar now reported to the State Department that the CCP's key ministries were being

evacuated from Peking to safer locations outside the range of aerial delivered weapons.¹⁰ This also supported a 3 November report from the Hong Kong Consular General, sent directly to Acheson, that Communist China was definitely preparing for war and that "a large-scale military intervention by the CCF in Korea was imminent."¹¹

Most significant was General Willoughby's estimate of Chicom capabilities throughout the period. Whereas the opening paragraphs of his daily reports had consistently delineated the front lines of the battlefield as fluid and indeterminate (since the Inchon landings), on 5 November, and without any amplifying comments, a solid front line appeared from west to east across Korea! Concurrently the "enemy capabilities" section, listed in order of greatest probability, saw the following changes made between four and five November (emphasis added):

- 4 November:
- (1) Conduct Guerrilla operations
 - (2) Retreat to adjacent border areas
 - (3) Reinforce with Manchurian forces
 - (4) Defend
 - (5) Conduct limited Air Operations
 - (6) Conduct limited Offensive Operations
- 5 November:
- (1) CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
 - (2) Reinforce with Manchurian forces
 - (3) Conduct Guerrilla Operations
 - (4) Defend
 - (5) Conduct Offensive Air Operations

The dramatic shift is obvious.¹² Offensive operations changed from a "limited" character and climbed to the most probable course of action from one day to the next; air operations also lost the "limited" qualifier and "retreat" was eliminated entirely. The indicators prompting this new position were:¹³

- (1) Strengthening of CCF forces
- (2) Removal of industry from Manchuria
- (3) Removal of noncombatants from the border area

Events of the first week of November, along with new intelligence gathered, also prompted revised estimates based on the enemy's new capabilities. Willoughby declared, "Regarding the Chinese intention to launch a large scale counteroffensive; the enemy certainly has the potential particularly in ground forces, and is in a position to exercise this capability at any time and without warning."¹⁴ Two days later MacArthur's intelligence accurately analyzed the most dangerous CCF capability disclosed to date: "The Chinese Communists have already displayed their ability to infiltrate troops into Korea with comparative ease . . . utilizing back roads and the cover of darkness, it is entirely possible that the CCF could secretly move all or a large portion of this readily available force into position south of the Yalu in preparation for a counteroffensive."¹⁵ Logistics, it was felt, would be simplified by the inviolate border and the short distances.

The CIA absorbed Willoughby's reports as they provided a major source of the data available,¹⁶ and now, also, revised their own estimate of the situation. On 6 November they reported to Truman that the CCF had the capability to "actually force the United Nations forces to withdraw . . ."¹⁷ with the forces on hand. The report explained that Peking was taking a major risk to its prestige in Asia by entering Korea and confirmed that preparations were underway for a "general war,"¹⁸ one that could "logically" result from the potential for chaotic situations being engendered by the buildup of forces and tensions along the border.¹⁹ However, the report concluded that the risks were probably too great for Peking to intervene, but warned that definitive answers regarding its intentions were not available.

MacArthur's report to the JCS punctuated this intelligence, he told Washington, "Recent captures [of POW's] . . . together with increased resistance being encountered . . . removes the problem of Chinese intervention from the realm of the academic and turns it into a serious proximate threat."²⁰ Even more ominous was another message that stated, "We now face an entirely new war This command has done everything humanly possible within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength."²¹

Within the State Department there were elements that echoed MacArthur's forebodings of potential Communist

Chinese capabilities. Edward Barrett (Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs) conducted an analysis of the propaganda being broadcast internally within Communist China and told Dean Rusk that the Chinese were definitely preparing for war and not necessarily planning to "limit their participation" to small numbers.²² Barrett had prefaced his memo to Rusk, "I don't want to appear as an alarmist but" Additionally, Mr. Clubb, who had warned against crossing the 38th parallel, officially informed Rusk that, in his considered opinion, Peking's objective was at least the pre-war status quo, and at most the expulsion of all UN forces from the peninsula by force.²³ Rusk, armed with this input from his advisors, would later figure prominently in the effort to refocus American objectives in Korea.

One final intelligence input has been deliberately singled out for presentation at the end of this section because of its potential impact to the issue. Picked up by Willoughby's intelligence staff, and mentioned only in Appleman's authoritative analysis of the ground combat in Korea, was a transmission over Peking Radio, on 4 November, that was buried in the "Miscellaneous" section of the intelligence summary of that date.²⁴ The headline to this report read "A Declaration of War?" and went on to detail the text of the message and provide comments. The joint communique broadcasted was sponsored by 10 groups within Communist China led, significantly, by the CCP. The

text describes China's fear of invasion by the US and the "disregarding [of] warnings issued by China." It further commits Peking to "assist the Korean People," claiming this course was both "logical and fully righteous." Admitting to their unfavorable military position the Communists claimed, "Resistance alone has possibilities of teaching the imperialists a lesson." China's objective was stated again as "the expressed determination and desire of 475,000,000 people of China . . . [to] intensively resist invasion by crushing it." It called for the formal mobilization of all official democratic political parties within Communist China to carry out their duties for "resisting American invasion, assisting Korea, and protecting China." The G-2 comment underscores the text's significance:

Thus far, the Chinese Communists have issued no commentary that can be identified as official that is as indicative of an overt declaration of war as is the above broadcast. Each of the preceding broadcasts reported by friendly monitors has sounded like bombast and boasting. THE ABOVE DOES NOT [emphasis added].

Unfortunately, this and most of the intelligence indicators garnered during the first week of November were to lose their impact during the battlefield quiet of the next three weeks.

Reappraisal of the Situation

As this shocking intelligence and MacArthur's situation reports reached the JCS, they were at a loss to explain what was occurring. Their initial estimate leaned on the

intelligence concerning Peking's statements that protection of the Yalu's power plants was the CCF's lone objective in Korea. However, noting the enemy's increased capabilities, they also realized that Communist China could force a war of attrition on the US that would significantly weaken their ability to react to Soviet thrusts elsewhere or, as MacArthur intimated, the Chinese Communists could throw UN forces off the peninsula entirely.²⁵

One thing was now abundantly clear; the intelligence derived from the first week of November confirmed a significantly increased military commitment on the part of Communist China, one that required an immediate reappraisal of the American objective in Korea.

Correspondingly, the JCS asked MacArthur for an updated assessment to explain the highly ominous messages he had sent subsequent to American contact with Communist troops of the CCF and "in light of what appears to be overt intervention by Chinese Communists units." Also, the JCS warned MacArthur that in light of this entry, "your objectives . . . may have to be reexamined."²⁶

MacArthur's first reply was puzzling; stating, "It is impossible at this time to appraise the intervention,"²⁷ he went on nonetheless to list four possible objectives of the Communists. They ranged from all-out war to reinforcement to securing some small area of North Korea so as to sustain Kim Il-sung's regime. Yet, MacArthur could not commit himself because, he claimed, he needed more

facts. Two days later, threatened with being forced to stop in the face of the CCF, MacArthur was more definitive; he now believed "this was not a full-scale intervention," but conceded that the CCF might reinforce themselves to "a point rendering our resumption of advance impossible and even forcing a movement in retrograde."²⁸ Still he was adamant that the drive not be halted, "rejecting completely any course of action short of his original intentions."²⁹ In a tone quite different from the recent alarming messages announcing the threat the Communists posed to his command, MacArthur informed the JCS that his Air Force could limit the number of CCF entering Korea and ground forces could deal with those already there.³⁰ This status quo position was not necessarily shared by the JCS or the President's advisors in Washington.

Armed with CINCFE's estimate, President Truman now saw the immediate objectives clearly: one, providing Europe with reassurances that the war would not be widened: two, gaining maximum support in the UN for opposing the intervention of Communist China; and, three, ascertaining the strength and the direction and aim of the Chinese Communist effort.³¹ An NSC meeting was called for 9 November to discuss options for the future. This meeting brought together all the President's key advisors to include JCS representation. The issues were plain to the administration. Acheson stated, "All the President's advisors in this matter, civilian and military, knew that

something was badly wrong," and yet, the perceived lack of facts on Chinese intentions left them in a quandary about "what it was, how to find out, and what to do about it."³²

At this meeting General Bradley defended MacArthur's troop dispositions before tough questioning from Acheson and Marshall, claiming he was deployed to carry out a broad mission with a minimum of forces.³³ Bradley, though, admitted that a defensive position established farther south was more tenable. This would require a radical revision of the US objective in Korea that Bradley said would hurt UN prestige and overall moral. The JCS's bottom line recommendation supported a diplomatic solution, to wit, informing Communist China that the Yalu's power plants would be left alone, and waiting for their subsequent reactions to reveal their real intentions. General war, the JCS felt, was not a possibility, but a protracted war designed to weaken the US, as MacArthur had indicated, explained Peking's actions best. Their recommendation would force the Communist Chinese to reveal this to the United States.

Acheson was incensed over MacArthur's positions requiring the control of widely split forces to come from Tokyo.³⁴ He proposed solving the problem of Chinese intervention by establishing a buffer zone to protect what he felt were untenable troop dispositions and to insure that the UN's non-aggression policy would be communicated

to Peking.³⁵ Yet he knew Peking would demand the removal of all foreign troops, and this would leave Korea open to Communist domination.

What resulted from this meeting were certain interim measures, described as the President's immediate objectives above. While they were not concrete and did little except continue on a modified version of the present course, authors like Schnabel feel they were logical given the perceived unknowns. Also, this course of action was in agreement with the CIA's view of events. Bedell Smith, the CIA's Director, had told Truman shortly before the meeting that he felt the Communist Chinese desired only a "cordon sanitaire" to protect the Yalu hydroelectric facilities. He offered as evidence Peking's apparent attempts to only halt the UN advance before ceasing hostilities and disappearing.³⁶

Circumstances however, now involved a changed situation. By 9 November the CCF had melted back into the hills. Spurred by the apparent lack of resistance, MacArthur demanded to be allowed to continue, recommending a UN resolution condemning Peking's invasion and warning the Chinese to return to Manchuria or suffer the consequences. He closed this message to the JCS by ensuring them complete victory if "our determination and indomitable will do not desert us."³⁷ Clearly his optimism had returned, but CINCPAC did not share the caution

that was apparent in Washington; this would lead shortly to disastrous conclusions.

The requested UN resolution initiated efforts to calm Communist Chinese fears and defuse the situation. Introduced by six allied nations, the resolution told Peking, "It is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone."³⁸ This resolution reflected the perceived Chinese objective of defending the Yalu power facilities and sought to alleviate their fears of an impending invasion of Manchuria. However, the Soviets, sensing a shift in the momentum of the war, exercised their veto power over the effort. Failing in this, President Truman made a public statement to the effect that no attack was planned on Manchuria and that UN forces would stop at the border. Whether these efforts had any impact is not known; if they did, MacArthur's resumption of offensive operations destroyed any goodwill thus achieved.

The CCF Fades Away--The Lull

After devastating attacks on UN forces during the period 25 October-6 November, the CCF broke contact and faded into the hills from whence they came. Their rigid camouflage discipline defied detection by aerial observation. Though badly hurt themselves, they continued to reinforce with units infiltrating across the Yalu River. By the third week in November the CCF would number between

300,000 and 400,000 (the exact number cannot be agreed upon) and comprise two Field Armies (3d and 4th).³⁹ The lull was needed by the CCF to bring their units up to full strength and, it is postulated, observe American reactions to the initial attacks for signs of a softening of their position.⁴⁰ Goulden, and others, rightly feel that this first act of aggression was designed to, again, serve as a warning to the US to stay away from the border. It is logical to assume that, seeing their verbal warnings disregarded, Peking felt warning in some more definitive form was required. If such was indeed the case, this warning, too, would come to nothing.⁴¹

MacArthur's Plans Completed

MacArthur now communicated his desire to resume the offensive. He planned a self-proclaimed "reconnaissance in force" operation⁴² that was designed to "take accurate measure of enemy strength" in order to resolve unknowns.⁴³ This was the famous "home by Christmas" offensive that would spark the CCF counteroffensive.⁴⁴ But in order to mount this offensive he had to wait for the accumulation of adequate supply stocks. By mid-November supply had become critical due to overextended lines. The Eighth Army had only one day's reserve of ammunition and a similar amount of fuel.⁴⁵

During the interim period MacArthur told his Air Force Commander General George Stratemayer, to, in effect, destroy North Korea. MacArthur wanted every conceivable

military target leveled, to include the Yalu River bridges.⁴⁶ In compliance, Stratemayer planned to attack the Yalu bridge, joining Antung with North Korea, the next day with ninety B-29 bombers and so informed Washington. What followed illustrated both the extent to which Washington perceived Korea as a limited war and the jealousy with which MacArthur guarded his prerogative to wage war as he knew it.⁴⁷

The Defense Department informed Secretary Acheson (Under Secretary Robert Lovett was the conduit) of the mission, and both agreed the danger of hitting the Manchurian side of the river outweighed the operational advantages. Dean Rusk pointed out that the British, by agreement, had to be informed before such action could be taken. Marshall was informed and agreed it should be stopped unless it was a necessity. Truman concurred and directed the JCS to inquire of MacArthur as to the reasons for the mission. His reply was immediate; "Men and material in large numbers are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu for Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command."⁴⁸ Truman authorized the mission, bowing to the commander on the scene's judgement. The JCS, too, would not again challenge MacArthur or take any action that gave pretense of controlling the war from 7000 miles away.⁴⁹ The future restrictions imposed against bombing the river bridges and conducting the "hot

pursuit" of planes evading over the Manchurian border would upset MacArthur, but he would be freed to otherwise "do what he could in a military way . . ."50 with the forces on the ground.

Intelligence in the Interim

During this period the intelligence picture of the front lines quieted dramatically. There still remained a solid enemy front line trace and new units were continually being identified as committed,⁵¹ but the major intelligence garnered during this period concerned the CCF reinforcement effort. As already noted, the CCF was incredibly adept at infiltrating personnel and emplacing them in camouflaged positions. However, they were not as effective at disguising their motor transport moving into North Korea. Truck traffic was a major input to Willoughby's daily summaries and reported sightings were virtually continuous from the first of November. Consequently, the Air Force had numerous "turkey shoots" on these largely defenseless columns and scored heavily. Yet the purpose behind these movements seemed lost on the FEC, G-2. One particular sighting is quoted here as an example of the numerous ones reported: "A high priority telephone flash from Far East Air Force today reports that several 100-150 vehicle convoys were observed . . ." along roads moving south from the Yalu and "that the roads north of the Yalu River in Manchuria were 'packed solid' with vehicles moving south."⁵² Unfortunately, the impact of these

convoys was misread by Willoughby who would admit later that rail and vehicle traffic was heavy during the first, second, and fourth weeks of November, but would cite the lack of the same during the third week as justification for downgrading the CCF capabilities prior to the launching of the final offensive (see below). In explaining his claim that the CCF's offensive capability was degraded, he would offer as evidence the decrease in vehicle traffic during this crucial third week, stating the reduction "was not attributable to weather, since conditions were more favorable during this period" than any of the others.⁵³ What escaped Willoughby was the obvious tenet that infiltration tactics dictate shunning clear weather and full moons!

Intelligence concerning the scope of the threat continued to increase, although there were many units identified but as yet not "accepted" as residing in Korea in full strength. Whereas on the first of the month FEC, G-2 placed 16,500 CCF troops in Korea and over 450,000 in Manchuria, mid-month estimates climbed to 76,800 and 850,000 in these respective areas. The CCF, according to Willoughby, still retained the ability to "seize the initiative and launch offensive operations."⁵⁴ Indicated, too, was "the great vulnerability" of the gap between the two commands (Eighth Army and Tenth Corps) wherein there lay up to five divisions capable of launching "imperiling offensive operations."⁵⁵ Clearly the

estimates of CCF capability did not reflect the small numbers of forces "accepted" in Korea. One or both of these perceptions were wrong; history would later show that capabilities were well known but enemy strength was miscalculated.

Also at mid-month several reports from a variety of embassies boded tidings of Chicom intentions.⁵⁶ From Sweden came reports that a large-scale intervention was being prepared. From Burma reports indicated the Communist Chinese were now willing to go to any length to support North Korea and were "fostering mass hysteria" based on allegations that a US invasion was imminent. On 19 November, FEC, G-2 also concluded that propaganda indicated a major effort was under way.⁵⁷

Too, there were other indicators that Communist China was preparing for a general war. Besides the removal of industry from Manchuria, there were other economic indicators available. In Hong Kong Communist-sponsored merchants were causing confusion as they made preparations for the impact of war on commerce.⁵⁸ The evacuation of potential targets like Peking added even more emphasis.

On 17 November there arrived evidence that the Communist Chinese were making one last conciliatory gesture in hopes of a political solution.⁵⁹ The Netherlands, an oft used conduit, reported the Chicom actions to date reflected fear for the security of Manchuria; it was suggested that should the Americans halt 50 miles short of

the border, further hostilities would be prevented. On the strength of reports such as these, efforts to translate this intelligence into actions on the ground in Korea were to be made one more time.

"The Last Clear Chance"

Increasingly, the intelligence pointed towards a large-scale Communist Chinese intervention. By 21 November "strong sentiment was developing among other members of the United Nations and within the Department of State for a solution to the problem of Chinese intervention through means other than those currently planned."⁶⁰ Characterized by Schnabel as the "cautious view," and by Acheson as "the last clear chance,"⁶¹ the State Department was seriously considering a buffer state or neutral buffer zone as a means of stopping further military action in Korea. Specific proposals, General Bolte (Army G-3) told Army Chief of Staff Lawton Collins, were already being drawn up. Bolte was unalterably opposed; he supported MacArthur's plans and felt the Defense Department should also. The issue came to a head at a 21 November meeting between State and Defense representatives. Elements within Defense were violently opposed to the State solution, claiming it would increase, rather than decrease, tension worldwide, that negotiating with Communists had historically been fruitless, and that "it is not envisioned that the Chinese Communists can succeed in driving presently committed United Nations forces from Korea."⁶²

As a result of the conference a compromise solution was agreed upon by both parties. It allowed for both the victory desired by the military and the buffer zone that State proposed. Dean Rusk recognized the JCS's reluctance to approach MacArthur over inhibiting his actions and took the initiative by drafting the proposal, feeling time was of the essence. When finished, Rusk forwarded the message to the JCS, noting, "We fully recognize that the Department of State does not have drafting responsibility with respect to this message,"⁶³ but that he only sought to ease the bureaucratic red tape. The draft was given minor changes and sent to MacArthur on the eve of his offensive.

The proposal could, General Collins told MacArthur, be in no way considered a directive. It left MacArthur with the initiative to decide which way the war should go and apologetically offered, "It is recognized that from the point of view of the commander in the field this course of action may leave much to be desired."⁶⁴ The message recommended:

- (1) MacArthur push to the Yalu and then retire, leaving ROK forces to act as a covering force.
- (2) Place all other UN forces in reserve positions at a line well south of the Yalu.

This plan would be used only in the event that effective resistance ended. MacArthur rejected the plan out of hand. His reasoning, he told the JCS, was that only the river provided a viable defensive position. Also, the proposal amounted to a betrayal of the Korean people.

Further, the issue of the Yalu's power plants was ridiculous as ROK elements had reported finding one, the Ch'san plant, stripped and inoperable. Finally, MacArthur told Washington that UN forces were committed to seizing the entire border area as directed by resolution. Scolding in tone, he stated that "entry of Chinese Communist forces into the Korean conflict was a risk which the United States had taken with its eyes wide open." Besides, there was nothing to worry about as "in his opinion there had been no noticeable political or military reaction by the Chinese."⁶⁵

Intelligence on the Eve of Disaster

The issue was thus settled. No attempt would be made to go to the President with the proposal "until full opportunity [had] been given for further consideration of your views," Collins told MacArthur.⁶⁶ MacArthur had rejected the effort and thereby retained the freedom of action he desired. That freedom was exercised on the same day the proposal was received as UN forces again struck out North. This offensive was justified within FEC by significantly altered intelligence from that of the first week of the month. No longer was the "Conduct of Offensive Operations" listed as the most probable course of enemy action; it had been replaced by "Conduct of Reinforcing Operations."⁶⁷ Willoughby's final assessment maintained that a capability for offensive action still existed but felt a "high level decision" had been made to defend in

present positions due to massive supply problems being experienced by the enemy.⁶⁸ There is a dual irony to this final estimate. One, it appeared concurrently with pressures for a political solution to the Chinese intervention; and two, it concluded with the comment that the enemy front line was felt to be "suspiciously quiet."⁶⁹

Conversely, the CIA's final estimate of 24 November appeared to support the State Department's position. It concluded that the Chinese intervention would continue to increase in scope if a political solution was not found.⁷⁰ Still, their operative comment remained: "Available evidence is not conclusive as to whether or not to intervene."⁷¹

Conclusion

Many of this chapter's conclusions apply to the topic as a whole; thus they will be presented in the concluding summary chapter. However, three things bear mentioning here by way of a prelude. First, it is clear that, as General Willoughby admitted after the fact, the intelligence available in both Washington and Tokyo indicated "the potential threat of a large-scale invasion became increasingly evident,"⁷² and it was a threat of serious proportion. Second, it is apparent that the Chinese Communists unwittingly aided the US in sustaining a course of action that ran counter to Peking's aims in Korea by breaking contact so as to allow time for reflection.

For it was during this lull that proposals for a change in the American objective in Korea met the resolute resistance of MacArthur and elements within the military, resistance based on a false sense of security provided by a quiet battlefield. Finally, though it remains to be seen, some feel that the impending counteroffensive could have been prevented had General MacArthur changed his plans. However, "either the Supreme Commander had fallen victim to the wishful thinking and sometimes unjustified optimism that had characterized his career or, it could be argued, he had decided to let a situation develop where a major confrontation between the United States and Communist China would be inevitable."⁷³

CHAPTER 6

Analysis and Conclusions

The "home by Christmas" offensive of UN forces, called after the fact by MacArthur more a "reconnaissance in force,"¹ was met by the full force of the CCF strength. The ensuing retrograde, though brilliantly executed,² rapidly lost the territory gained since the Inchon landing. Within a week of the UN offensive's start dates, 24-26 November, the Eighth Army had retreated 50 miles and the Tenth Corps was locked in a CCF vise and fighting its way out. Unable to attack targets within the CCF's Manchurian sanctuary, the UN forces were required, by mid-December, to retire back to the 38th Parallel, eventually to reposition even further south below Seoul. In the east, forces were being extracted from the port of Hungnam under CCF pressure. Aided by the frozen Yalu River and long winter nights that facilitated movement, the CCF soundly defeated the Eighth Army and almost trapped the entire First Marine Division. The Communist Chinese took heavy toll of MacArthur's command. From the initial contact in October through mid-December, casualties surpassed 50,000.³ This military action resulted in a tactical and strategic success for Peking. Militarily the CCF stalemated the UN forces until an armistice was signed in 1953. That document insured the survivability of a communist bastion in North Korea.

This chapter will examine and analyze the events and the causes for the striking Communist Chinese victory. Initially, a hypothesis will be presented regarding the reasons for Peking's entry into the war, as they will illuminate what follows. Also, the factors that contributed to the surprise counteroffensive will be examined, not as apologia but as a preface to the conclusions. Finally, the key questions involved in the topic will be considered and conclusions offered.

Why Intervention?

The reasons behind the decision of Communist China to intervene on a large scale in Korea may never be known absolutely. However, postulates offered by authorities on the subject reflect the character and outlook of Communist regime and clarify why the intervention was, militarily, so dramatic.

Allen Whiting believes the Chinese intervened reluctantly.⁴ This would explain the lateness of the intervention and the numerous attempted warnings made by Peking. Further, China feared a US-instigated change in the regional power balance. The impending treaty with Japan and US moves to contain Peking's expansionist tendencies caused apprehension and damaged Communist China's prestige. They took the risks of intervention knowing that, at that point, even a stalemate amounted to a victory.

Harold Hinton sees the primary Chinese motive as

protecting the security of Manchuria.⁵ The area's industrial capacity was vital to the reconstruction of a war torn economy, and they feared Western intentions towards dominating Manchuria, and therefore China.

An appealing postulate is put forward by William Whitson. His authoritative analysis of the Chinese military, in particular, the high command's influence on policy, proposes a link between Mao's decision to enter Korea and his fear of the growing, decentralized power bases of his army commanders. Whitson claims this threat was alleviated by committing the forces that supported the autonomy of these commanders to fighting in Korea.

What is clear from the above positions is the thread of the components of the Chinese Communist character and outlook. It was an attitude about world relations and Mao's perceived place in that sphere that apparently the US failed to analyze. It provided one of the factors contributing to the CCF's success in Korea, as will be seen below.

Surprise Attack--Contributing Factors

One of the most important contributors to the eventual hostilities was the two antagonists' perceptions of one another. Mao and his Communist hierarchy clearly saw a threat from what was, to them, an imperialist United States. American actions, in Mao's view, supported this feeling. All efforts on the part of the Truman administration to allay Peking's fears had lost credibility

based on the historical relations between the two countries and military actions subsequent to the start of the war. That the United States was a status quo power was not adequately communicated. Certainly the Chinese ideological and experiential components that formed the foundations of Peking's particular brand of Communism contributed to this fact. Also, Communist China's immaturity as a nation and weak international position surely played a role in Chinese perceptions of the US as a powerful bully in Asia. Still, Mao correctly assessed America as a "Paper Tiger," one to be taken lightly strategically, but seriously on the tactical level; Peking's actions confirmed this in Korea. On one hand the Chinese almost toyed with American emotions by communicating rage, anger, fear, and warning. On the other, they infiltrated Korea expertly and with an archaically equipped force soundly trounced the Americans.⁶

The United States also lacked insight into the Communist Chinese values and goals. They mistook Peking for a dotting subordinate of Moscow's whims, without any internal national interests save following the Soviet lead. However, there is not enough evidence to prove this was the case.⁷ Too, America saw Communist China as a weak nation with insurmountable internal problems and a ruling party that had only a tenuous hold on power.⁸ This drove the administration's actions and supported

MacArthur's determination not to refuse the battlefield to the Chinese.

Another factor was the happenstance of events as seen from the opponents' perspectives. The US, for her part, made every diplomatic attempt to dissuade Communist China from the belief that it was going to be invaded. Peking, in discounting the credibility of American pronouncements while concentrating on US actions and the American press, created a self-fulfilling prophecy based on its perceptions. To Peking, events foretold an inevitable march into Manchuria by UN forces, spurred on by US imperialism. In disregarding Communist China's warnings and reacting antagonistically towards Mao's military preparations, the US exacerbated and confirmed Peking's suspicions. Thus from the Chinese viewpoint the results were inevitable; as Tang Tsou states, "The ground for this confrontation was prepared by the erratic shifts of policy in 1947 and 1948, the partisan debate and deadlock in 1949 and 1950, and the failure to effect a prompt disengagement," either before or after the initial clashes between UN and CCF forces.⁹

There were also intelligence shortfalls involved in the misreading of Chinese intentions. The lack of information on those intentions could be blamed on restrictions placed on intelligence collection and the limited capabilities of an infant strategic intelligence system. MacArthur admitted that his own intelligence was weak on this topic, but he cited restrictions against the conduct of

intelligence inside Communist China as the cause.¹⁰ MacArthur pointed to the strategic intelligence community as responsible for providing the information in hearings before the Senate,¹¹ but these agencies had limited resources and were forced to determine internal intentions through "outward manifestations",¹² an impossible task in most cases. Though "certain agencies" allied with the Nationalist Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan were available as sources of information and many still classified CIA operations were conducted, the net results were consistently determined to be inconclusive. The infancy of the National Intelligence Community, racked with growing pains, also inhibited effective collection. Thus systematic problems and restrictions were to plague efficient collection during the period.

A further factor contributing to the surprise was the lack of effective communications between the two parties. Being forced to conduct critical dialogue through intermediaries hampered effective exchanges. That the efforts were made on both sides was significant, but the conduits themselves came into question at one point and other channels proved inadequate. This, according to Whiting, was not significant in and of itself, due to the common practice, seen in evidence throughout this period, of speaking internationally through public speeches and the use of the press.¹³ But these outlets, unfortunately, proved unsatisfactory.

Also, the available tactical warning suffered from poor communications. Not only were military reactions misread; the system for reporting events was sluggish. Tokyo was operating on intelligence that was often 30 hours old when received¹⁴, and Willoughby's complete reports had to be couriered to Washington, a process that took days,¹⁵ further increasing the time lag. However, daily teleconferences insured critical intelligence and analysis was timely in the contemporary sense and thus minimized this factor.

Finally, the tactics and deceptions employed by the CCF displayed incredible discipline and were wildly successful. First, the infiltration of over 300,000 men into a small segment of North Korea without, in the main, being detected was a monumental accomplishment. It required correspondingly monumental methods and incredible stamina. Marching only after dark and lying perfectly still during the hours of daylight, the CCF avoided detection. Officers were ordered to shoot anyone who broke camouflage discipline. Distances moved by large units were immense, one divisional sized unit having covered 286 miles in 16 days.¹⁶

Effective also were deception plans designed to confuse American intelligence as to CCF strength. Early POW's identified as coming from a variety of divisions claimed to be from one "unit" (designated 54th, 55th, or 56th). In actuality, these "units" were army designations. The US mistook them for piecemeal introduction of reinforcing

elements supporting the rearming of remaining North Korean elements.¹⁷ This worked only in the initial stages of the conflict, however. By the end of November the CCF order of battle had been accurately determined.

Warning and Surprise

In turning to the key elements of this paper's hypothesis, the first question that has to be addressed is the issue of intelligence failure. Clearly, the above presentation of the facts refutes any claim that the intelligence picture was completely inadequate. Decision-makers in both Tokyo and Washington were appraised of the scope of the threat and the seriousness of its capabilities. A review of the voluminous tactical intelligence gathered reveals that the indications of a major Chinese Communist presence were abundantly available. Too, the strategic intelligence community recognized and accurately portrayed the situation leading up to the November counter-offensive. All the relevant Communist Chinese warnings, backed up by the military dispositions designed to enhance their credibility, were collected and analyzed by American intelligence. From the beginning of the Korean conflict intelligence kept a "close watch" on the political and military reactions of both China and Russia.¹⁸ MacArthur's claim that he faced a "serious proximate threat" accurately portrayed the tactical picture. CIA estimates also warned of the increasing potential for a massive Chinese intervention. Were it not for the fact

that Chou En-lai's warnings were disregarded, the picture would have been clear. As it was, the Americans were quite aware that the Communist Chinese had intervened; the only data missing, to their minds, was what Peking intended to do with the forces in Korea. The only major deficiencies in intelligence lay in the areas of underestimating CCF strength within Korea (100,000 versus 300,000) and in appraising Peking's intentions.

However, this latter deficiency was a direct result of the reluctance on the part of the American hierarchy to believe what the intelligence revealed. In the tactical realm, MacArthur's and Willoughby's optimism prior to the final offensive was not shared by lower echelons within the UN forces. Marine General Smith bypassed MacArthur in mid-November and informed the Commandant of the Marine Corps of the potentially untenable position he was occupying.¹⁹ General Walker's advancing Eighth Army was cautious and moved slowly; MacArthur reprimanded Walker and admonished him to move faster. Walker's G-3, Colonel John Dabney, did not believe the optimistic G-2 reports and spent many late nights poring over intelligence reports. He concluded the CCF was present in much greater numbers than officially released.²⁰ Line troops opposing the CCF knew what they faced but felt MacArthur must have had some divine knowledge guiding his actions.

Strategically, the warning intelligence was discounted. However, it has been shown that the mid-level

managers and analysts did not necessarily agree with their superiors' cavalier attitude about the intelligence received.

Clearly, the information and some accurate analysis was available. The intelligence effort suffered only from the inability to translate the message into a form believable to the decisionmakers.

Warning

If there was no intelligence failure, then the next question must be: was the intelligence accurately communicated so as to convey a warning? The answer, based on the facts, is a clear affirmative. In fact this warning had two components. The first component is represented by Peking's direct communications regarding their intentions. Hinted at in August and early September, the warnings became bold and direct in late September and early October. That they were discounted, however, has to be regarded as a factor in determining whether a warning was, in fact, received. Discounted the warnings were, but not entirely; Acheson admitted in October that "Chou's words were a warning, not to be disregarded"21 That the warning was caveated, due to the circumstances of transmission, by American policymakers is also clear from the facts. However, the warnings were not completely mistreated; they spurred action. Thus these diplomatic warnings must be considered valid.

The second component of warning in this situation

relates to Chinese actions rather than their words. Though this warning was not verbally or textually transmitted, the message was clearer than any pronouncement from Peking or article in the Communist press. Beginning with the first clashes in October and November and continuing through the infiltration and build-up in November, CCF actions consistently displayed a menace that evolved into a known threat of significant proportions. This second component proved to be the operative warning as far as US actions were concerned. That it was indeed adequately communicated really needs no discussion to prove the point. The reading of any one of General Willoughby's Daily Intelligence Summaries (DIS) from early November on abundantly illustrates the picture. They consistently warned that a massive counteroffensive was a distinct possibility and could not be disregarded.

Yet both components of the available warning were degraded, to a certain extent, by the analysis of them. Strategic warning, largely represented by the first component, along with other pronouncements and the press, lost credibility through the sources and methods of transmission. Tactical warning, available after the first contact, made up the second component. It too was downgraded by a reluctance to see the picture the information offered for what it was. This was due in part to a typical intelligence failing; it is entirely possible for intelligence to be discounted because it is not what

the decisionmaker wants to hear. That this characteristic was operative in this situation is hinted at in Willoughby's handling of his estimates. Did his downgrading of CCF offensive capabilities and belief in a CCF decision to defend in place appear coincidentally at a time when pressure for abandoning the drive to the Yalu was reaching its climax? This author thinks not. First, there was little or no evidence to conclude CCF strength had weakened during the lull (evidence the voluminous rail and vehicle traffic for one); and second, previous to the report on a possible decision to defend, there had been numerous sources indicating that the converse was planned. Still, there is no hard evidence that MacArthur or Willoughby intentionally altered the command's position, only conjecture.

Another factor, however, in Willoughby's faulty analysis was his failure to apply Chinese actions to the tactics the CCF had displayed in the past. In effect, he did not read his own book. A Defense Department (then the War Department) study published in July 1945 on the Chinese Communist Movement would have been most instructive.²² This report characterized the movement as well coordinated and led, popular among the people, and "aggressively expansionist," as a political policy.

In regards to CCF tactics, it noted the preferred ones used (when the enemy had superior firepower) were to "strike on the flanks and rear and then disappear before

the enemy [could] effect a concentration of forces The communist attempt to strike at the critical time when the [enemy] are preparing for mopping up operations By necessity they . . . fight small engagements of short duration They have attained a high degree of efficiency, their leaders have courage, initiative, and self-reliance."²³ This blueprint for CCF operations in Korea would have enhanced the analysis of actions observed in Korea and quite possibly pointed to Communist China's ultimate intentions.

Also in evidence was an ignorance of Communism as a political institution. Fully recognized was the importance of propaganda in winning the support of the people. However, the preeminent position of the party (the CCP) was not evidently known. The apparent misreading of what for all intents and purposes was a declaration of war on America is just one indication of this factor. Sponsored by the CCP, it was not considered an authoritative statement of policy. It is now known that any statement by the Party in a Communist state is de facto policy whether or not it is dictated as such. Had US analysts realized this, the 4 November broadcast over Peking Radio would have had more of an impact.

Actions Taken

Whatever the problems associated with the adequacy with which warning was communicated, they become irrelevant when the final question of this paper is addressed, that is,

what, if any, actions were taken based on the warning, and were these actions adequate to the circumstances? Effective warning requires three components: warning intelligence, communication of same to the decisionmaker, and some form of action based on the warning. It should be clear that in this situation action was taken based on Communist Chinese warning. This renders moot issues surrounding the credibility of the warning's method or style of communication as it closes the warning loop. Thus, in the strictest sense, America was warned of Chinese intentions. A review of the events will explain.

The initial warnings by Chou En-lai (along with other various agencies within Communist China) not to cross the 38th parallel were largely disregarded as a bluff. That the warning was received is a fact; MacArthur's copy arrived only hours after the meeting and he was gotten out of bed to read it. The subsequent action taken: none. Does this indicate that a warning has not been received? No, it simply means that the action taken was intentional inaction. This closed the warning loop; intentionally ignoring a warning is action through inaction. However, this exaggerates the situation a bit. The warning did cause distinct action; the effort to observe and discern Chinese intentions was re-emphasized. Indeed, the directive sending MacArthur into North Korea enjoined him to "make special efforts to determine whether there is a Chinese Communist . . . threat."²⁴ Secretary Acheson

told embassies worldwide that information concerning possible Chinese Communist intentions was to be given top priority. Further, America redoubled efforts to inform Peking of its peaceful intentions in Asia. That these efforts failed was a function of China's historically based bias towards the credibility of these statements. What America construed as efforts to stabilize the situation Peking identified as indicators of malicious intent. This, as Beldon states, is a function of warning intelligence as one government's actions become the opponent's indicators.²⁵

The initial clashes, themselves a form of warning in this case, prompted several actions. As Secretary Acheson noted, there were an unprecedented number of meetings (15) between the administration's hierarchy during the last three weeks of November, with Korea and Peking's intervention on the agenda in each.²⁶ On two separate occasions (9 and 21 November) attempts were made to create a consensus for policy change. In each instance the result was watered down to a slightly modified version of the same plan. To the administration's credit, these modifications were designed to reiterate the policy of limiting the war in Korea. However, the actions taken proved to be short of what was required. Also, violations of Manchurian airspace, bombing of Chinese and Soviet territory, and MacArthur's actions and surrender pronouncements negated all these efforts to limit the war. The offensive was

resumed largely because of MacArthur's intransigence and desire for ultimate victory. As has been mentioned, underlings both on the front lines in Korea and within the State Department had acted on the perceived warning by informing their superiors of it, only to have their opinions overridden.

Thus warning had been surmised, communicated and acted upon. The question of the adequacy of those actions can at one and the same time be answered affirmatively and negatively. No, is the answer if you examine the results. The Chinese Communists successfully denied American victory in Korea, caused thousands of casualties, prolonged the war, and obtained a favorable, though costly, resolution of the conflict. On the other hand, it might be argued that based on America's perception of Communist China and the belief in its own capabilities, the actions taken were logical given the circumstances. Clearly illustrated here, then, is the necessity for both intelligence elements and decisionmakers to retain the capability to slough off their biases and view crisis through the eyes of the opponent and thereby better assess an opponent's intentions.²⁷

Final Conclusions

What remains to be evaluated is the root causes of the devastating surprise counteroffensive in November 1950. The magnitude of the destruction dwarfs the loss of life incurred at Pearl Harbor; and in the end the enemy prevailed over US forces, the converse of the result in

World War II. While this analysis does not necessarily relate to warning, action, or the adequacy of those actions, it helps pinpoint some key shortfalls that caused those actions taken to develop as they did.

It is illuminating to review the postulates of some of the authorities cited here for their perspectives. Acheson places blame on himself for not overcoming his unwillingness "to urge on the President a military course that his military advisors would not propose."²⁸ A buffer zone would have provided the best remedy, but MacArthur's position was clear and the JCS would not override him. This implies that the President was never offered a proposal from his advisors to halt MacArthur and places the blame on interdepartmental friction and MacArthur himself.

Goulden also indicates the warnings were wrongly disregarded and war ensued only because no contingency plans had been made, beyond the 27 September directive, in the event the Chinese were encountered.²⁹ This led to the confusion over what to do, and because of this confusion, the status quo was sustained. George also concurs with Gould but for different reasons.³⁰ He felt the slow deliberate actions of the Communist Chinese should have indicated that the October warnings had credibility.

Whiting places the majority of the blame on the lack of communications. This had the effect of forcing the US and Communist China to rely on false perceptions of one another. The difficulty each side had in "projecting

itself into the frame of reference within which the other operated" eventually resulted in war.³¹ This, he claims, illustrates the importance of communications in a limited-war situation.

Tsou sees the causes as both short and long term.³² He points to American debates over China policy and the policy itself as enhancing the inevitability of conflict. As MacArthur represented a militantly "new approach to Far Eastern affairs" which had widespread support among Truman's opponents, his viewpoint was not challenged by Washington based on the warning received. Overall American policy created behavior that acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy for the Chinese Communists and forced them to act.

This thesis will agree with some of the above and add one new postulate. Surely the friction between MacArthur and Washington and the former's immense standing and prescient judgement played a significant role in the ultimate result. His position had unchallengable credibility after Inchon and remained inviolate within military circles. Apparently this viewpoint prevailed over those of other agencies who sought changes to battlefield objectives. MacArthur's mindset refused to accept the concept of limited war. He told Appleman in reviewing his manuscript³³ that, had he known America's response to a third rate power's audacious attack would be to allow them to thumb their noses at America from Manchurian sanctuaries while the US did nothing, he would have resigned

immediately. Truman's global view saw the need for caution. The two collided but MacArthur's view won out, principally due to the trust the country puts in the commander on the scene. To Truman, MacArthur was better able to judge events.

Still, there was an element of ego in the relationship between MacArthur and Washington. How much effect this had can be seen in the dispatches sent back and forth. CINCPAC was ardent, demanding, and presumptuous while the JCS was overcome. Besides the numerous examples of this available in the situation reports, there is one particular instance that, in this author's opinion, exemplifies MacArthur's perceived position. When replying to the JCS's questioning of his authorization for US forces to advance beyond the restraining line in North Korea, MacArthur referred to the Wake Island meeting and preempted further JCS inquiries by stating that the issue had been covered with the President. In referring to that meeting MacArthur called it "my conference at Wake Island," when it point of fact it had been the President's conference!

These problems prompted inaction when action was needed. Yes, the warnings were improperly disregarded, but Whiting correctly blames the lack of effective communications and Tsou accurately pinpoints an inconsistent American policy that caused Chinese alienation and the misperceptions that led to the break in communications.

However, this analysis now returns to the original

questions examined. The questions of whether warning was (1), accepted and (2), adequately acted upon are the crux of this thesis. The answers supplied here were yes to the first question and a qualified no to the second. Yet there is a critical lesson to be learned from the Chinese intervention in Korea, and it represents this thesis's contribution to the topic. It goes beyond warning to the other side of the crisis equation, to what is actually being warned of, a threat. A threat is composed of intention and capability. While Chinese Communist intentions were "not known" (although this point is arguable), in the legitimate perception of the West, what was very well known was capability. Confusion over identifying, positively, Chinese intent led to inaction. But military planning, and the government's initiating directives, must always be guided by capability in light of an ignorance of intent. General Willoughby, in DIS #2957 (5 October),³⁴ in discussing the potential for Chinese intervention unwittingly revealed the answer to his dilemma; he was not to heed his own advice. In it he claimed, "The decision, if any [has been made to go to war], is beyond the purview of collective intelligence; it is a decision for war, on the highest level." Thus when two opposing armies face one another and are aware of each other's presence (as was the case in Korea), and of one another's capabilities, knowledge of intention should not be the primary catalyst in planning future moves. Plans

should be based on the capabilities of the enemy. As MacArthur indicated, the CCF threatened "the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command;"³⁵ subsequent action should have reflected this capability and concentrated on capability only. Robert Smith, reflecting on MacArthur's actions asks, "Why did he send his army plunging recklessly to the Yalu? Every able commander knows that enemy capabilities and not enemy intentions must be the measure by which he makes his plans."³⁶ Had this been the case, the events of 26 November might very well have been precluded. It was known that over 800,000 Communist Chinese lay within striking distance; if logical steps had been adopted to both accept the fact that further offensive action was folly and consolidate the gains to date, the crisis might have been averted. Actions should not reflect or be based on unknowns; they must revolve around what is known.

NOTES

Chapter 1

¹Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982) p. 136. The rapid demobilization of allied forces, particularly those of the U.S., after World War II created the necessity for a drastic turnaround in U.S. military policy requiring President Truman to mobilize the military to support South Korea.

²James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, vol. 3, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, USA, 1972), p. 226.

³Ibid., p. 229.

⁴William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (Dell Publishing Company, 1978), p. 724.

⁵Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969), p. 463. MacArthur informed the United Nations Security Council that U.N. forces "are presently in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units."

⁶Schnabel, p. 194.

⁷Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (California: The Rand Corporation, 1960), p. 116.

⁸Ibid., p. 122.

⁹Command Report, November 1950, GHO, FEC, UNC, Record Group 407, Washington National Records Center, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Maryland, p. 30, (hereafter referred to as Command Report, RG 407). This casualty figure includes all allied forces during the period of the initial contact with the CCF through the end of the first counteroffensive.

¹⁰Schnabel, p. 275.

¹¹U.S., Cong., Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, The Military Situation in the Far East, Hearing, 82d Cong., 1st Sess, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951), pp. 46-47.

¹²Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974).

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Manchester, p. 707. Evidence the importance President Truman placed on General MacArthur's assurances provided, "at the 15 October Wake Island meeting, that the Communist Chinese would not intervene."

¹⁵Appleman Manuscript, Record Group 319, National Archives Building, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., Chapter 32, pp. 40-42. (Hereafter referred to as Appleman Manuscript, RG 319).

¹⁶Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), p. 381.

¹⁷U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Department of State Publication, No. 8859 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), pp. 945-980. (Hereafter referred to as DSP, No. 8859)

Chapter 2

¹Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-50. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963).

²A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 165.

³Ibid.

⁴Tsou, p. 152.

⁵Ibid., p. 153.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p. 214.

⁸Ibid., p. 344

⁹Ibid., p. 350.

¹⁰Barnett, op. cit., p. 168.

¹¹Ibid., p. 169.

¹²Ibid., p. 170.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Tsou, p. 500.

¹⁵Lyman P. Slyke, The China White Papers: August 1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).

¹⁶Tsou, p. 512.

¹⁷Barnett, op. cit., p. 513.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁹Tsou, p. 513.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Tsou, p. 515. Both Phillip Jessup (Ambassador at Large) and other attendees at a State Department sponsored conference on the subject were in "very general agreement about the desirability of recognizing the Communist government"

²²Barnett, p. 171.

²³Tsou, p. 517.

²⁴Barnett, p. 174.

²⁵Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1956), p. 371.

²⁶Tsou, p. 517.

²⁷Ibid., p. 505.

²⁸Barnett, p. 17.

²⁹Tsou, p. 506.

³⁰Whiting, p. 12.

³¹Ibid., p. 27.

³²Ibid., p. 14.

³³Tsou, p. 511.

³⁴Whiting, p. 5. This is an excerpt from an article written by K'o Pai-nien, "The Foreign Policy of the New People's Democracy," in 1949.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 1-4.

³⁶Ibid., p. 2.

³⁷Ibid., p. 3.

³⁸Ibid., p. 6.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 2-3.

⁴²Bryce Denno, "Communist China's Military Policy and Foreign Relations," (Ph.D. Diss., American University, 1971), p. 82.

⁴³Ibid., p. 83.

⁴⁴Ibid, p. 84.

⁴⁵Whiting, p. 9.

⁴⁶Ibid. Correspondent Edgar Snow was given this impression when interviewing Mao in 1936.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 9-10.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁹New York Times, 14 August 1949, p. 20, col. 1.

⁵⁰Tsou, p. 183.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 235.

⁵²Ibid., p. 236.

⁵³Kenneth S. Chern, Dilemma in China: America's Policy Debate, 1945 (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1980), p. 226.

⁵⁴Tsou, pp. 540-45.

⁵⁵Barnett, p. 175.

⁵⁶Lyman P. Van Slyke, ed., The Chinese Communist Movement: A Report of the United States War Department, July 1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 221.

⁵⁷Dupre Jones, ed., "China: US Policy Since 1945,"
Congressional Quarterly, 1980, pp. 88-92.

⁵⁸Whiting, p. 51.

⁵⁹Tsou, p. 550.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 590.

⁶¹Chern, p. 226.

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¹Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 209.

²Jones, op. cit., pp. 88-92.

³Schnabel, p. 74.

⁴Ibid., p. 71.

⁵Tsou, p. 562.

⁶Hinton, p. 209.

⁷Tsou, p. 563.

⁸Roderick MacFarquhar, Ed., Sino-American Relations, 1949-71 (New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 83-84.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Whiting, p. 94.

¹¹Tsou, p. 562.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 563.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 562.

¹⁵Denno, p. 90.

¹⁶Whiting, pp. 2-3.

- 17Gregory Clark, In Fear of China (London: Barrie and Rockliff, The Cresset Press, 1973) p. 30.
- 18Whiting, p. 53.
- 19Ibid., p. 50.
- 20New York Times, 15 July 1950, p. 3, col. 6.
- 21Whiting, p. 44.
- 22Ibid.
- 23Acheson, p. 419.
- 24Whiting, pp. 59-61.
- 25Ibid., p. 61.
- 26Acheson, p. 420.
- 27Truman, p. 341.
- 28Goulden, p. 104.
- 29Truman, p. 345.
- 30Schnabel, p. 82.
- 31Ibid, pp. 86-98.
- 32Goulden, p. 136.
- 33Truman, p. 347.
- 34Schnabel, pp. 115-124.
- 35Ibid., pp. 139-141.
- 36Manchester, pp. 682-693.
- 37Ibid., p. 688.
- 38Schnabel, p. 152.
- 39Manchester, p. 688.
- 40Ibid.
- 41Truman, p. 344.
- 42Goulden, p. 275.

⁴³Schnabel, p. 85.

⁴⁴Truman, p. 350.

⁴⁵Supra, p. 42.

⁴⁶New York Times, 2 July 1950, p. 5, col. 3; 11 July 1950, p. 20, col. 3; 13 July 1950, p. 4, col. 3. These articles identified some 200,000 Chicom troops in Manchuria and named an inside source claiming Communist China intended to enter the war.

⁴⁷Whiting, p. 64.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 65.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰New York Times, 20 August 1950, p. 1, col. 5; 30 August 1950, p. 27, col. 4.

⁵¹Whiting, p. 71.

⁵²New York Times, 17 August 1950, p. 4, col. 7; 20 August 1950, p. 1, col. 5. The former claimed Sino-Soviet talks ended in a promise by Peking to send forces to Korea, while the latter hinted the troops were on the way.

⁵³Whiting, p. 79-80.

⁵⁴New York Times, 27 August 1950, p. 10, col. 5.

⁵⁵Whiting, p. 70.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 99.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 84.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 100.

⁶⁰Schnabel, p. 184.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 173-87.

- 62Truman, p. 360.
- 63Acheson, p. 441.
- 64Whiting, p. 96.
- 65Schnabel, p. 182.
- 66Ibid.
- 67Ibid.
- 68Truman, p. 359.
- 69Schnabel, p. 183.
- 70Ibid., p. 184.
- 71Goulden, p. 235 and Acheson, p. 454.
- 72Schnabel, pp. 183-88.
- 73Ibid., p. 179.
- 74New York Times, 29 August 1950, p. 1, col. 6.
- 75Goulden, p. 234.
- 76Ibid., pp. 276-77.
- 77Acheson, p. 452.
- 78Ibid., p. 451.
- 79New York Times, 11 September 1950, p. 1, col. 5.
- 80Jones, op. cit., p. 92.
- 81Appleman Manuscript, RG 319, Chapter 32 and New York Times, 17 August 1950, p. 4, col. 7.
- 82Whiting, p. 88.
- 83Ibid., p. 96.
- 84Ibid., p. 92.
- 85Ibid., p. 96.
- 86Ibid., p. 98.
- 87Goulden, p. 236.

- 88Denno, p. 95.
- 89Whiting, p. 96.
- 90Jones, op. cit., p. 91.
- 91Denno, p. 94.
- 92Tsou, p. 577.
- 93Whiting, p. 97.
- 94Ibid., p. 105.
- 95K.M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), p. 108.
- 96Whiting, p. 107.
- 97Ibid.
- 98Ibid., p. 108.
- 99Ibid., p. 99.
- 100Hinton, p. 26.
- 101Jules Archer, Chou En-Lai (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1973), p. 92.
- 102Tsou, p. 563.

Chapter 4

- 1Whiting, p. 108.
- 2Panikkar, p. 110.
- 3Schnabel, p. 193.
- 4Whiting, p. 94.
- 5Schnabel, p. 224.
- 6Truman, p. 362.
- 7Ibid., p. 361.
- 8Acheson, p. 452.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰DSP, No. 8859, p. 864.

¹¹Ibid., p. 849.

¹²Ibid., p. 875.

¹³Schnabel, p. 200.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 212.

¹⁷Whiting, p. 94.

¹⁸Truman, p. 360.

¹⁹Acheson, p. 463.

²⁰Francis H. Heller, The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Kansas: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), p. 199.

²¹DSP, No. 8859, p. 933.

²²Truman, p. 362.

²³Schnabel, p. 233.

²⁴Ibid. Whiting claims the 16th was the day. Yet at this point only the act is relevant.

²⁵Acheson, p. 456.

²⁶DSP, No. 8859, pp. 915-16.

²⁷Appleman Manuscript, RG 319. There are revealing handwritten notes inscribed on the draft Appleman sent to MacArthur for comment.

²⁸Truman, p. 384.

²⁹Appleman Manuscript, RG 319.

³⁰Truman, p. 366.

- 31Appleman Manuscript, RG 319.
- 32DSP, No. 8859, p. 974.
- 33Truman, pp. 368-369.
- 34Acheson, p. 461.
- 35Truman, p. 366.
- 36DSP, No. 8859, p. 945.
- 37Ibid., p. 946.
- 38Schnabel, p. 230.
- 39Truman, p. 372.
- 40Schnabel, p. 231.
- 41DSP, No. 8859, p. 980.
- 42Acheson, p. 462.
- 43Schnabel, p. 218.
- 44Ibid.
- 45Ibid.
- 46Acheson, p. 462.
- 47Whiting, p. 130.
- 48Ibid., p. 131.
- 49Ibid., p. 127.
- 50Ibid., p. 128.
- 51Ibid.
- 52Ibid., pp. 130-32.
- 53Schnabel, p. 234.
- 54Ibid., p. 233.
- 55Ibid., p. 234.

⁵⁶James McGovern, To the Yalu: From the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur's Dismissal (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1972), p. 54.

⁵⁷Schnabel, p. 234.

⁵⁸Whiting, pp. 109-112.

Chapter 5

¹Schnabel, p. 236.

²Ibid., p. 235.

³Ibid., p. 238.

⁴Daily Intelligence Summary, No. 2976, Supporting Document Annex, G2, 1 November - 31 November 1950, Command Report, November 1950, Record Group 407, Washington National Records Center, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Maryland, p. 1-f. (Hereafter DIS, No. xxxx, SDA, G2, RG 307).

⁵Schnabel, p. 240.

⁶DIS, No. 2986, SDA, G2, RG 407, p. 5.

⁷DIS, No. 2977, SDA, G2, RG 407, p. 1-f.

⁸DSP, No. 8859, pp. 1034-35.

⁹DIS, No. 2989, SDA, G2, RG 407, p. 1-h.

¹⁰DSP, No. 8859, p. 1093.

¹¹Ibid., p. 1034.

¹²Dis, No. 2979, SDA, G2, RG 407, p. 1-e.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵DIS, No. 2981, SDA, G2, RG 407, 1-g.

- ¹⁶Schnabel, p. 199.
- ¹⁷Truman, p. 376.
- ¹⁸Ibid.
- ¹⁹Schnabel, p. 240.
- ²⁰DIS, No.2981, SDA, G2, RG 407, p. 1-f.
- ²¹DSP, No. 8859, p. 1023.
- ²²Ibid., pp. 1034-35.
- ²³DIS, No. 2980, SDA, G2, RG 407, p. 1-h.
- ²⁴Truman, p. 384.
- ²⁵Ibid., pp. 378-79.
- ²⁶Schnabel, pp. 240 and 250.
- ²⁷Truman, p. 373.
- ²⁸Ibid., p. 377.
- ²⁹Schnabel, p. 250.
- ³⁰Ibid., p. 251.
- ³¹Truman, p. 381.
- ³²Acheson, p. 466.
- ³³Schnabel, p. 255
- ³⁴Acheson, p. 466.
- ³⁵Schnabel, p. 255.
- ³⁶DSP, No. 8859, p. 1025.
- ³⁷Schnabel, p. 252.
- ³⁸Ibid., p. 249.
- ³⁹Whiting, p. 164.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., p. 140.
- ⁴¹Goulden, p. 276.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 271.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 270.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷DIS, No. 1999, SDA, G2, RG 207, p. 1-h.

⁶⁸Schnabel, pp. 272-73.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰DSP, No. 8859, p. 1220.

⁷¹Appleman Manuscript, RG 319.

⁷²Command Report, RG 407, p. 22.

⁷³McGovern, p. 54.

Chapter 6

¹The Military Situation in the Far East, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. p. 51.

²Whiting, pp. 163-65.

³Supra, p. 2.

⁴Whiting, p. 109.

⁵Hinton, p. 26.

⁶Tsou, p. 579.

⁷Whiting, p. 152.

⁸Tsou, p. 574.

⁹Ibid., p. 550.

¹⁰Appleman Manuscript, RG 319.

¹¹Supra, p. 3.

¹²Schnabel, p. 199.

¹³Whiting, p. 169.

¹⁴Acheson, p. 466.

⁴²Appleman Manuscript, RG 319. MacArthur claimed that his entire justification for continuing the offensive was to seek out the enemy and assess his intentions. Fearing the immense strength of the CCF, MacArthur contends he had foreseen the need for and begun planning retrograde operations before the events of 24-26 November.

⁴³Acheson, p. 467.

⁴⁴Whiting, p. 163.

⁴⁵Schnabel, p. 258.

⁴⁶Acheson, p. 463.

⁴⁷Truman, pp. 374-75.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Acheson, p. 467.

⁵⁰Truman, p. 380.

⁵¹Appleman Manuscript, RG 319.

⁵²DIS, No. 2982, SDA, G2, RG 407, p. 1-g.

⁵³Command Report, RG 407, p. 23.

⁵⁴Schnabel, p. 259.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 263-64.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 266.

⁵⁷DIS, No. 2993, SDA, G2, RG 407, p. 1-h.

⁵⁸Schnabel, p. 266.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 266-68.

⁶⁰Acheson, p. 466.

⁶¹Schnabel, p. 267.

⁶²Ibid., p. 268.

⁶³Ibid., p. 269.

- 15Schnabel, p. 199.
- 16Appleman Manuscript, RG 319.
- 17Ibid., p. 10.
- 18Schnabel, p. 196.
- 19Ibid., p. 261.
- 20Appleman Manuscript, RG 319, p. 12.
- 21Acheson, p. 452.
- 22Van Slyke, ed., pp. 192-194.
- 23Ibid.
- 24Schnabel, p. 182.
- 25Tom C. Beldon, "Indications, Warning, and Crisis Operations," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 1977, p. 184.
- 26Acheson, p. 466.
- 27Beldon, pp. 184-85.
- 28Acheson, p. 468.
- 29Goulden, p. 276.
- 30Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 1-2.
- 31Whiting, pp. 171-72.
- 32Tsou, p. 588.
- 33Appleman Manuscript, RG 319.
- 34Command Report, RG 407, p. 21.
- 35Truman, p. 375.
- 36Robert Smith, MacArthur in Korea: The Naked Emperor (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 105.

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